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Abstract
This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF)
with infinitely-lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each pe-
riod. An SCF is repeated-implementable in (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium if there
exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that (i) its equi-
librium set is non-empty and (ii) every equilibrium outcome corresponds to the
desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncer-
tainty. We first show, with minor qualifications, that in the complete information
environment an SCF is repeated-implementable if and only if it is efficient. We then
extend this result to the incomplete information setup. In particular, it is shown
that in this case efficiency is sufficient to ensure the characterization part of repeated
implementation. For the existence part, incentive compatibility is sufficient but not
necessary. In the case of interdependent values, existence can also be established
with an intuitive condition stipulating that deviations can be detected by at least
one agent other than the deviator. Our incomplete information analysis can be
extended to incorporate the notion of ex post equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Implementation theory, sometimes referred to as the theory of full implementation, has
been concerned with designing mechanisms, or game forms, that implement desired social
choices in every equilibrium of the mechanism. Numerous characterizations of imple-
mentable social choice rules have been obtained in one-shot settings in which agents
interact only once. However, many real world institutions, from voting and markets to
contracts, are used repeatedly by their participants, and implementation theory has yet
to offer much to the question of what is generally implementable in repeated contexts
(see, for example, Jackson [11]).1
This paper examines repeated implementation in environments in which agents’ prefer-
ences are determined stochastically across time and, therefore, a sequence of mechanisms
need to be devised in order to repeatedly implement desired social choices. In our setup,
the agents are infinitely-lived and their preferences represented by state-dependent utilities
with the state being drawn randomly in each period from an identical prior distribution.
Utilities are not necessarily transferable. The information structure of our setup is gen-
eral and allows for both private and interdependent values as well as correlated types,
including the case of complete information.
In the one-shot implementation problem the critical conditions for implementing a so-
cial choice rule are (Maskin) monotonicity for the complete information case and Bayesian
monotonicity (an extension of Maskin monotonicity) and incentive compatibility for the
incomplete information case. These conditions are necessary for implementation and, to-
gether with some minor assumptions, are also sufficient. However, they can be very strong
restrictions as many desirable social choice rules fail to satisfy them (see the surveys of
Jackson [11], Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [20] and Serrano [28], among others).
As is the case between one-shot and repeated games a repeated implementation prob-
lem introduces fundamental differences to what we have learned about implementation in
the one-shot context. In particular, one-shot implementability does not imply repeated
implementability if the agents can co-ordinate on histories, thereby creating other, possi-
bly unwanted, equilibria.
1The literature on dynamic mechanism design does not address the issue of full-implementation since it
is concerned only with establishing the existence of a single equilibrium of some mechanism that possesses
the desired properties.
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To gain some intuition, consider a social choice function that satisfies sufficiency con-
ditions for Nash implementation in the one-shot complete information setup (e.g. mono-
tonicity and no veto power) and a mechanism that implements it (e.g. the mechanism
proposed by Maskin [18]). Suppose now that the agents play this mechanism repeatedly.
Assume also that in each period a state is drawn independently from a fixed distribution
and the realizations are complete information.2 Then, the game played by the agent is
simply a repeated game with random states. Since in the stage game every Nash equilib-
rium outcome corresponds to the desired outcome in each state, this repeated game has an
equilibrium in which each agent plays the desired action at each period/state regardless
of past histories. However, we also know from the study of repeated games (see Mailaith
and Samuelson [16]) that unless minmax expected utility profile of the stage game lies
on the efficient payoff frontier of the repeated game, by the Folk theorem, there will be
many equilibrium paths along which unwanted outcomes are implemented. Thus, the
conditions that guarantee one-shot implemenation are not sufficient for repeated imple-
mentation. Our results below also show that they are not necessary either.
Given the multiple equilibria and collusion possibilities in repeated environments, at
first glance, implementation in such settings seems a very daunting task. But our un-
derstanding of repeated interactions also provides us with several clues as to how such
repeated implementation may be achieved. First, a critical condition for repeated im-
plementation is likely to be some form of efficiency of the social choices, that is, the
payoff profile of the social choice function ought to lie on the efficient frontier of the cor-
responding repeated game/implementation payoffs. Second, we need to devise a sequence
of mechanisms such that, roughly speaking, the agents’ individually rational payoffs also
coincide with the efficient payoff profile of the social choice function.
While repeated play introduces the possibility of co-ordinating on histories by the
agents, thereby creating difficulties towards full repeated implementation, it also allows
for more structure in the mechanisms that the planner can enforce. We introduce a
sequence of mechanisms, or a regime, such that the mechanism played in a given period
depends on the past history of mechanisms played and the agents’ corresponding actions.
This way the infinite future gives the planner additional leverage: the planner can alter
the future mechanisms in a way that rewards desirable behavior while punishing the
undesirable.
2A detailed example is provided in Section 3 below.
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Formally, we consider repeated implementation of a social choice function (henceforth,
called SCF) in the following sense: there exists a regime such that (i) its equilibrium set
is non-empty and (ii) in any equilibrium of the regime, the desired social choice is imple-
mented at every possible history of past play of the regime and realizations of states. A
weaker notion of repeated implementation seeks the equilibrium continuation payoff (dis-
counted average expected utilities) of each agent at every possible history to correspond
precisely to the one-shot payoff (expected utility) of the social choices. Our complete
information analysis adopts Nash equilibrium as the solution concept; the incomplete
information analysis considers repeated implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.3
Our results establish for the general, complete or incomplete information, environment
that, with some minor qualifications, the characterization part of repeated implementation
is achievable if and only if the SCF is efficient. Our main messages are most cleanly deliv-
ered in the complete information setup. Here, we first demonstrate the following necessity
result: if the agents are sufficiently patient and an SCF is repeated-implementable, it
cannot be Pareto-dominated (in terms of expected utilities) by another SCF whose range
belongs to that of the desired SCF. Just as the theory of repeated game suggests, the
agents can indeed “collude” in our repeated implementation setup if there is a possibility
of collective benefits.
We then present the paper’s main result for the complete information case: under some
minor conditions, every efficient SCF can be repeatedly implemented. This sufficiency
result is obtained by constructing for each SCF a canonical regime in which, at any
history along an equilibrium path, each agent’s continuation payoff has a lower bound
equal to his payoff from the SCF, thereby ensuring the individually rational payoff profile
in any continuation game to be no less than the desired profile. It then follows that if
the latter is located on the efficient frontier the agents cannot sustain any collusion away
from the desired payoff profile; moreover, if there is a unique SCF associated with such
payoffs then repeated implementation of desired outcomes is achieved.
The construction of the canonical regime involves two steps. We first show, for each
player i, that there exists a regime Si in which the player obtains a payoff exactly equal
to that from the SCF and, then, embed this into the canonical regime such that each
3Thus, our solution concepts do not rely on imposing credibility and/or particular belief specification
off-the-equilibrium, which have been adopted elsewhere to sharpen predictions (for example, Moore and
Repullo [23], Abreu and Sen [2] and Bergin and Sen [6]).
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agent i can always induce Si in the continuation game by an appropriate deviation from
his equilibrium strategy. The first step is obtained by applying Sorin’s [27] observation
that with infinite horizon any payoff can be generated exactly by the discounted average
payoff from some sequence of outcomes, as long as the discount factor is sufficiently large.4
The second step is obtained by allowing each agent the possibility of making himself the
“odd-one-out”, thereby inducing Si in the continuation play, in any equilibrium.
These arguments also enable us to handle the incomplete information case, delivering
results that closely parallel those above. These analogous results are obtained for very
general incomplete information setup in which no restrictions are imposed on the infor-
mation structure (both private value and interdependent value cases are allowed, as well
as correlated types). Also, as with complete information, no (Bayesian) monotonicity
assumption is needed for this result. This is important to note because monotonicity in
the incomplete information setup is a very demanding restriction (see Serrano [28]).
With incomplete information, however, there are several additional issues. First, we
evaluate repeated implementation in terms of expected continuation payoffs computed at
the beginning of a regime. This is because continuation payoffs in general depend on an
agent’s ex post beliefs about the others’ past private information at different histories but
we do not want our solution concept to depend on such beliefs.
Second, although efficiency pins down payoffs of every equilibrium, it still remains
to establish existence of an equilibrium in the canonical regime. Incentive compatibil-
ity offers one natural sufficiency condition for existence. However, we also demonstrate
how we can do without incentive compatibility. In the interdependent value case, where
there can be a serious conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (see Maskin
[17] and Jehiel and Moldovanu [14]), the same set of results are obtained by replacing
incentive compatibility with an intuitive condition that we call identifiablity, if the agents
are sufficiently patient. Identifiability requires that when agents announce types and all
but one agent reports his type truthfully then, upon learning his utility at the end of
the period, someone other than the untruthful odd-one-out will discover that there was
a lie. Given identifiability, we construct another regime that, while maintaining the de-
sired payoff properties of its equilibrium set, admits a truth-telling equilibrium based on
incentives of repeated play instead of one-shot incentive compatibility of the SCF. Such
4In our setup, the required threshold on discount factor is one half and, therefore, our main sufficiency
results do not in fact depend on an arbitrarily large discount factor.
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incentives involve punishment when someone misreports his type.
Third, we can extend our incomplete information analysis by adopting the notion of ex
post equilibrium, thereby requiring the agents’ strategies to be mutually optimal for every
possible realization of past and present types and not just for some given distribution (see
Bergemann and Morris [4][5] for some recent contributions to one-shot implementation
that address this issue). The precise nature of the agents’ private information are not
relevant in our constructive arguments and, in fact, the more stringent restrictions imposed
by ex post equilibrium enable us to derive a sharper set of results that are closer to the
results with complete information.
To this date, only few papers address the problem of repeated implementation. Kalai
and Ledyard [15] and Chambers [7] ask the question of implementing an infinite sequence
of outcomes when the agents’ preferences are fixed. Kalai and Ledyard [15] find that, if
the social planner is more patient than the agents and, moreover, is interested only in the
long-run implementation of a sequence of outcomes, he can elicit the agents’ preferences
truthfully in dominant strategies. Chambers [7] applies the intuitions behind the virtual
implementation literature to demonstrate that, in a continuous time, complete information
setup, any outcome sequence that realizes every feasible outcome for a positive amount
of time satisfies monotonicity and no veto power and, hence, is Nash implementable.
In these models, however, there is only one piece of information to be extracted from
the agents who, therefore, do not interact repeatedly themselves. More recently, Jackson
and Sonnenschein [12] consider linking a specific, independent private values, Bayesian
implementation problem with a large, but finite, number of independent copies of itself. If
the linkage takes place through time, their setup can be interpreted as a particular finitely
repeated implementation problem. The authors restrict their attention to a sequence of
revelation mechanisms in which each agent is budgeted in his choice of messages according
to the prior distribution over his possible types. They find that for any ex ante Pareto
efficient SCF all equilibrium payoffs of such a budgeted mechanism must approximate
the target payoff profile corresponding to the SCF, as long as the agents are sufficiently
patient and the horizon sufficiently long.
In contrast to Jackson and Sonnenschein [12], our setup deals with infinitely-lived
agents and a fully general information structure that allows for interdependent values
as well as complete information. In terms of the results, we derive precise, rather than
approximate, repeated implementation of an efficient SCF at every possible history of
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the regime, not just in terms of payoffs computed at the outset. Our main results do not
require the discount factor to be arbitrarily large. Furthermore, these results are obtained
with arguments that are very much distinct from those of [12].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first introduces one-shot implementation
with complete information which will provide the basic definitions and notation through-
out the paper. Section 3 then describes the infinitely repeated implementation problem
and presents our main results for the complete information setup. In Section 4, we ex-
tend the analysis to incorporate incomplete information. Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks about potential extensions of our analysis. Some proofs are relegated to an Ap-
pendix. Also, we provide a Supplementary Material to present some results and proofs
whose details are left out for space reasons.
2 Complete information: preliminaries
Let I be a finite, non-singleton set of agents; with some abuse of notation, I also denotes
the cardinality of this set. Let A be a finite set of outcomes and Θ be a finite, non-
singleton set of the possible states and p denote a probability distribution defined on Θ
such that p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Agent i’s state-dependent utility function is given by
ui : A×Θ→ R. An implementation problem, P , is a collection P = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ].
An SCF f in an implementation problem P is a mapping f : Θ→ A such that f(θ) ∈ A
for any θ ∈ Θ. The range of f is the set f(Θ) = {a ∈ A : a ∈ f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ}.
Let F denote the set of all possible SCFs and, for any f ∈ F , define F (f) = {f ′ ∈ F :
f ′(Θ) ⊆ f(Θ)} as the set of all SCFs whose range belongs to f(Θ).
For an outcome a ∈ A, define vi(a) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(a, θ) as its expected utility, or
(one-shot) payoff, to agent i. Similarly, though with some abuse of notation, for an SCF
f define vi(f) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(f(θ), θ). Denote the profile of payoffs associated with f by
v(f) = (vi(f))i∈I . Let V =
{
v(f) ∈ RI : f ∈ F} be the set of expected utility profiles of
all possible SCFs. Also, for a given f ∈ F , let V (f) = {(vi(f ′))i∈I ∈ RI : f ′ ∈ F (f)} be
the set of payoff profiles of all SCFs whose ranges belong to the range of f . We write
co(V ) and co(V (f)) for the convex hulls of the two sets, respectively.
A payoff profile v′ = (v′1, .., v
′
I) ∈ co(V ) is said to Pareto dominate another profile
v = (v1, .., vI) if v
′
i ≥ vi for all i with the inequality being strict for at least one agent.
Furthermore, v′ strictly Pareto dominates v if the inequality is strict for all i. An efficient
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SCF is defined as follows.
Definition 1 An SCF f is efficient if there exists no v′ ∈ co(V ) that Pareto dominates
v(f); f is strictly efficient if it is efficient and there exists no f ′ ∈ F , f ′ 6= f , such that
v(f ′) = v(f).
Our notion of efficiency is similar to ex ante Pareto efficiency used by Jackson and
Sonnenschein [12]. The difference is that we define efficiency over the convex hull of the
set of expected utility profiles of all possible SCFs. As will shortly become clear, this
reflects the set of payoffs that can be obtained in an infinitely repeated implementation
problem (i.e. discounted average expected utility profiles).5
We also define efficiency in the range as follows.
Definition 2 An SCF f is efficient in the range if there exists no v′ ∈ co(V (f)) that
Pareto dominates v(f); f is strictly efficient on the range if it is efficient in the range
and there exists no f ′ ∈ F (f), f ′ 6= f , such that v(f ′) = v(f).
As a benchmark, we next specify Nash implementation in the one-shot context. A
mechanism is defined as g = (M g, ψg), where M g = M g1 × · · · ×M gI is a cross product of
message spaces and ψg : M g → A is an outcome function such that ψg(m) ∈ A for any
message profile m = (m1, . . . ,mI) ∈M g. Let G be the set of all feasible mechanisms.
Given a mechanism g = (M g, ψg), we denote by Ng(θ) ⊆M g the set of Nash equilibria
of the game induced by g in state θ. We then say that an SCF f is Nash implementable
if there exists a mechanism g such that, for all θ ∈ Θ, ψg(m) = f(θ) for all m ∈ Ng(θ).
The seminal result on Nash implementation is due to Maskin [18]: (i) If an SCF f is
Nash implementable, f satisfies monotonicity; (ii) If I ≥ 3, and if f satisfies monotonicity
and no veto power, f is Nash implementable.6
Montonicity can be a strong concept.7 It may not even be consistent with efficiency
in standard problems such as voting or auction, and as result, efficient SCFs may not be
5Clearly an efficient f is ex post Pareto efficient in that, given state θ, f(θ) is Pareto efficient. An ex
post Pareto efficient SCF needs not however be efficient.
6An SCF f is monotonic if, for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and a = f(θ) such that a 6= f(θ′), there exist some i ∈ I
and b ∈ A such that ui(a, θ) ≥ ui(b, θ) and ui(a, θ′) < ui(b, θ′). An SCF f satisfies no veto power if,
whenever i, θ and a are such that uj(a, θ) ≥ uj(b, θ) for all j 6= i and all b ∈ A, then a = f(θ).
7Some formal results showing the restrictiveness of monotonicity can be found in Mueller and Sat-
terthwaite [25], Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin [9] and Saijo [26].
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implementable in such one-shot settings. To illustrate this, consider an implementation
problem where I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A = {a, b, c}, Θ = {θ′, θ′′} and the agents’ state-contingent
utilities are given below:
θ′ θ′′
i = i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
a 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 3
b 1 3 2 2 2 3 3 2
c 2 1 3 1 1 1 2 1
The SCF f is such that f(θ′) = a and f(θ′′) = b. Notice that f is utilitarian (i.e.
maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities) and, hence, (strictly) efficient; moreover, in a
voting context, such social objectives can be interpreted as representing a scoring rule,
such as the Borda count. However, the SCF is not monotonic. The position of outcome
a does not change in any agent’s preference ordering across the two states and yet a is
f(θ′) but not f(θ′′).
Consider another example with three players/outcomes and the following utilities:
θ′ θ′′
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
a 30 0 0 10 0 0
b 0 10 0 0 30 0
c 0 0 20 0 0 20
This is an auction without transfers. Outcomes a, b and c represent the object being
awarded to agent 1, 2 and 3, respectively, and each agent derives positive utility if and
only if he obtains the object. In this case, the relative ranking of outcomes does not
change for any agent but the social choice may vary with agents’ preference intensity such
that f(θ′) = a and f(θ′′) = b. Here, such an SCF, which is clearly efficient, has no hope
of satisfying monotonicity, or even ordinality, which allows for virtual implementation
(Matsushima [21] and Abreu and Sen [3]).8
8An SCF f is ordinal if, whenever f(θ) 6= f(θ′), there exist some individual i and two outcomes
(lotteries) a, b ∈ A such that ui(a, θ) ≥ ui(b, θ) and ui(a, θ′) < ui(b, θ′).
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3 Complete information: repeated implementation
3.1 A motivating example
We begin by discussing an illustrative example. Consider the following case: I = {1, 2, 3},
A = {a, b, c}, Θ = {θ′, θ′′} and the agents’ state-contingent utilities are given below:
θ′ θ′′
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
a 4 2 2 3 1 2
b 0 3 3 0 4 4
c 0 0 4 0 2 3
The SCF f is such that f(θ′) = a and f(θ′′) = b. This SCF is efficient, monotonic and
satisfies no veto power. The Maskin mechanism,M = (M,ψ), for f is defined as follows:
Mi = Θ× A× Z+ (where Z+ is the set of non-negative integers) for all i and ψ satisfies
1. if mi = (θ, f(θ), 0) for all i, ψ(m) = f(θ);
2. if there exists some i such that mj = (θ, f(θ), 0) for all j 6= i and mi = (·, a˜, ·) 6= mj,
ψ(m) = a˜ if ui(f(θ), θ) ≥ ui(a˜, θ) and ψ(m) = f(θ) if ui(f(θ), θ) < ui(a˜, θ);
3. if m = ((θi, ai, zi))i∈I is of any other type and i is lowest-indexed agent among those
who announce the highest integer, ψ(m) = ai.
By monotonicity and no veto power of f , for each θ, the unique Nash equilibrium of
M consists of each agent announcing (θ, f(θ), 0), thereby inducing outcome f(θ).
Next, consider the infinitely repeated version of Maskin mechanism, where in each
period state θ is drawn randomly and the agents play the same Maskin mechanism. Then,
the players face an infinitely repeated game with random state at each period. Clearly, this
repeated game admits an equilibrium in which the agents play the unique Nash equilibrium
of the stage game in each state regardless of past history, thereby implementing f in each
period. However, if the agents are sufficiently patient, there will be other equilibria and
the SCF cannot be (uniquely) implemented.
For instance, consider the following repeated game strategies which implement out-
come b in both states of each period. Each agent reports (θ′′, b, 0) in each state/period
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with the following punishment schemes: (i) if either agent 1 or 2 deviates then each agent
ignores the deviation and continues to report the same; (ii) if agent 3 deviates then each
agent plays the stage game Nash equilibrium in each state/period thereafter independently
of subsequent history.
It is easy to see that neither agent 1 nor agent 2 has an incentive to deviate: although
agent 1 would prefer a over b in both states, the rules ofM do not allow implementation
of a from his unilateral deviation; on the other hand, agent 2 is getting his most preferred
outcome in each state. If the discount factor is sufficiently large, agent 3 does not want
to deviate either. He can indeed alter the implemented outcome in state θ′ and obtain c
instead of b (after all, this is the agent whose preference reversal supports monotonicity).
However, such a deviation would be met by (credible) punishment in which his contin-
uation payoff is a convex combination of 2 (in θ′) and 4 (in θ′′), which is less than the
equilibrium continuation payoff.
In the above example, we have deliberately chosen an SCF that is efficient (as well
as monotonic and satisfies no veto power). As a result, the Maskin mechanism in the
one-shot framework induces a unique Nash equilibrium payoffs on its efficient frontier.
Despite this, in the repeated framework, there are many equilibria and the SCF cannot
be implemented with a repeated version of Maskin mechanism. The reason for this lack of
implementation in this example is that, in the Maskin game form, the Nash equilibrium
payoffs are different from the minmax payoffs. For instance, agent 1’s minmax utility in
θ′ is equal to 0, resulting from m2 = m3 = (θ′′, f(θ′′), 0), which is less than his utility
from f(θ′) = a; in θ′′, minmax utilities of agents 2 and 3, which both equal 2, are below
their respective utilities from f(θ′′) = b. As a result, the set of individually rational
payoffs in the repeated setup is not singleton, and one can obtain numerous equilibrium
paths/payoffs with sufficiently patient agents.
The above example highlights the fundamental difference between repeated and one-
shot implementation, and suggests that one-shot implementability, characterized by mono-
tonicity and no veto power of an SCF, may be irrelevent for repeated implementability.
Our understanding of repeated interactions and the multiplicity of equilibria gives us two
clues. First, a critical condition for repeated implementation is likely to be some form of
efficiency of the social choices, that is, the payoff profile of the SCF ought to lie on the
efficient frontier of the repeated game/implementation payoffs. Second, we want to devise
a sequence of mechanisms such that, roughly speaking, the agents’ individually rational
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payoffs also coincide with the efficient payoff profile of the SCF. In what follows, we shall
demonstrate that these intuitions are indeed correct and, moreover, achievable.
3.2 Definitions
An infinitely repeated implementation problem is denoted by P∞, representing infinite
repetitions of the implementation problem P = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ]. Periods are indexed
by t ∈ Z++. In each period, the state is drawn from Θ from an independent and identical
probability distribution p.
An (uncertain) infinite sequence of outcomes is denoted by a∞ =
(
at,θ
)
t∈Z++,θ∈Θ, where
at,θ ∈ A is the outcome implemented in period t and state θ. Let A∞ denote the set of
all such sequences. Agents’ preferences over alternative infinite sequences of outcomes are
represented by discounted average expected utilities. Formally, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the agents’
common discount factor, and agent i’s (repeated game) payoffs are given by a mapping
pii : A
∞ → R such that
pii(a
∞) = (1− δ)
∑
t∈Z++
∑
θ∈Θ
δt−1p(θ)ui(at,θ, θ).
It is assumed that the structure of an infinitely repeated implementation problem
(including the discount factor) is common knowledge among the agents and, if there is
one, the social planner. The realized state in each period is complete information among
the agents but unobservable to an outsider.
We want to repeatedly implement an SCF in each period by devising a mechanism
for each period. A regime specifies a sequence of mechanisms contingent on the publicly
observable history of mechanisms played and the agents’ corresponding actions. It is
assumed that a planner, or the agents themselves, can commit to a regime at the outset.
Some notation is needed to formally define a regime. Given a mechanism g = (M g, ψg),
define Eg ≡ {(g,m)}m∈Mg , and let E = ∪g∈GEg. Let H t = E t−1 (the (t− 1)-fold Cartesian
product of E) represent the set of all possible histories of mechanisms played and the
agents’ corresponding actions over t − 1 periods. The initial history is empty (trivial)
and denoted by H1 = ∅. Also, let H∞ = ∪∞t=1H t. A typical history of mechanisms and
message profiles played is denoted by h ∈ H∞.
A regime, R, is then a mapping, or a set of transition rules, R : H∞ → G. Let
R|h refer to the continuation regime that regime R induces at history h ∈ H∞. Thus,
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R|h(h′) = R(h, h′) for any h, h′∞. A regime R is history-independent if and only if, for
any t and any h, h′ ∈ H t, R(h) = R(h′) ∈ G. Notice that, in such a history-independent
regime, the specified mechanisms may change over time in a pre-determined sequence. We
say that a regime R is stationary if and only if, for any h, h′ ∈ H∞, R(h) = R(h′) ∈ G.
Given a regime, a (pure) strategy for an agent depends on the sequences of realized
states as well as the histories of mechanisms and message profiles played.9 Define Ht as
the (t − 1)-fold Cartesian product of the set E × Θ, and let H1 = ∅ and H∞ = ∪∞t=1Ht
with its typical element denoted by h. Then, each agent i’s corresponding strategy,
σi, is a mapping σi : H
∞ × G × Θ → ∪g∈GM gi such that σi(h, g, θ) ∈ M gi for any
(h, g, θ) ∈ H∞×G×Θ. Let Σi be the set of all such strategies, and let Σ ≡ Σ1×· · ·×ΣI .
A strategy profile is denoted by σ ∈ Σ. We say that σi is a Markov strategy if and only
if σi(h, g, θ) = σi(h
′, g, θ) for any h,h′ ∈ H∞, g ∈ G and θ ∈ Θ. A strategy profile
σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) is Markov if and only if σi is Markov for each i.
Next, let θ(t) = (θ1, . . . , θt−1) ∈ Θt−1 denote a sequence of realized states up to, but
not including, period t with θ(1) = ∅. Let q(θ(t)) ≡ p(θ1)×· · ·× p(θt−1). Suppose that R
is the regime and σ the strategy profile chosen by the agents. Let us define the following
variables on the outcome path:
• h(θ(t), σ, R) ∈ Ht denotes the t − 1 period history generated by σ in R over state
realizations θ(t) ∈ Θt−1.
• gθ(t)(σ,R) ≡ (M θ(t)(σ,R), ψθ(t)(σ,R)) refers to the mechanism played at h(θ(t), σ, R).
• mθ(t),θt(σ,R) ∈ M θ(t)(σ,R) refers to the message profile reported at h(θ(t), σ, R)
when the current state is θt.
• aθ(t),θt(σ,R) ≡ ψθ(t) (mθ(t),θt(σ,R)) ∈ A refers to the outcome implemented at
h(θ(t), σ, R) when the current state is θt.
• piθ(t)i (σ,R), with slight abuse of notation, denotes agent i’s continuation payoff at
h(θ(t), σ, R); that is,
pi
θ(t)
i (σ,R) = (1− δ)
∑
s∈Z++
∑
θ(s)∈Θs−1
∑
θs∈Θ
δs−1q (θ(s), θs)ui
(
aθ(t),θ(s),θ
s
(σ,R), θs
)
.
9Although we restrict our attention to pure strategies, it is possible to extend the analysis to allow
for mixed strategies. See Section 5 below.
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For notational simplicity, let pii(σ,R) ≡ piθ(1)i (σ,R). Also, when the meaning is clear,
we shall sometimes suppress the arguments in the above variables and refer to them simply
as h(θ(t)), gθ(t), mθ(t),θ
t
, aθ(t),θ
t
and pi
θ(t)
i .
A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) is a Nash equilibrium of regime R if, for each i,
pii(σ,R) ≥ pii(σ′i, σ−i, R) for all σ′i ∈ Σi. Let Ωδ(R) ⊆ Σ denote the set of (pure strategy)
Nash equilibria of regime R with discount factor δ.
We are now ready to define the following notions of Nash repeated implementation.
Definition 3 An SCF f is payoff-repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium from period
τ if there exists a regime R such that (i) Ωδ(R) is non-empty; and (ii) every σ ∈ Ωδ(R)
is such that pi
θ(t)
i (σ,R) = vi(f) for any i, t ≥ τ and θ(t). An SCF f is repeated-
implementable in Nash equilibrium from period τ if, in addition, every σ ∈ Ωδ(R) is
such that aθ(t),θ
t
(σ,R) = f(θt) for any t ≥ τ , θ(t) and θt.
The first notion represents repeated implementation in terms of payoffs, while the
second asks for repeated implementation of outcomes and, therefore, is a stronger con-
cept. Repeated implementation from some period τ requires the existence of a regime
in which every Nash equilibrium delivers the correct continuation payoff profile or the
correct outcomes from period τ onwards for every possible sequence of state realizations.
3.3 Main results
3.3.1 Necessity
As illustrated by the motivating example in Section 3.1, our understanding of repeated
games suggests that some form of efficiency ought to play a necessary role towards re-
peated implementation. Our first result formalizes this by showing that, if the agents are
sufficiently patient and an SCF f is repeated-implementable from any period, then there
cannot be another SCF whose range also belongs to that of f such that all agents strictly
prefer it to f in expectation. Otherwise, there must be a “collusive” equilibrium in which
the agents obtain higher payoffs; but this is a contradiction.
Theorem 1 Consider any SCF f such that v(f) is strictly Pareto dominated by another
payoff profile v′ ∈ V (f). Then there exists δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and
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period τ , f cannot be repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium from period τ .10
Proof. Let δ¯ = 2ρ
2ρ+maxi[v′i−vi(f)]
, where ρ ≡ maxi∈I,θ∈Θ,a,a′∈A [ui(a, θ)− ui(a′, θ)]. Fix any
δ ∈ (δ¯, 1). We prove the claim by contradiction. So, suppose that there exists a regime
R∗ that repeated-implements f from some period τ .
For any strategy profile σ, any player i, any date t and sequence of states θ(t) and
θt, let Mi(θ(t), σ, R
∗) denote the set of messages that i can play at history h(θ(t), σ, R∗).
Also, with some abuse of notation, for any mi ∈Mi(θ(t), σ, R∗), let piθ(t),θ
t
i (σ)|mi represent
i’s continuation payoff from period t + 1 if the sequence of states (θ(t), θt) is observed, i
deviates from σi for only one period at h(θ(t), σ, R
∗) after observing θt and every other
agent plays the regime according to σ−i.
Consider any σ∗ ∈ Ωδ(R∗). Since σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium that repeated-implements
f from period τ , the following must be true about the equilibrium path: for any i, t ≥ τ ,
θ(t), θt and m′i ∈Mi(θ(t), σ∗, R∗),
(1− δ)ui(aθ(t),θt(σ∗, R∗), θt) + δvi(f) ≥ (1− δ)ui
(
a, θt
)
+ δpi
θ(t),θt
i (σ
∗)|m′i,
where a ≡ ψθ(t)(m′i,mθ(t),θ
t
−i (σ
∗, R∗)). This implies that, for any i, t ≥ τ , θ(t), θt and
m′i ∈Mi(θ(t), σ∗, R∗,
δpi
θ(t),θt
i (σ
∗)|m′i ≤ (1− δ)ρ+ δvi(f). (1)
Next, let f ′ ∈ F (f) be the SCF that induces the payoff profile v′. Then, for all i,
v′i = vi(f
′) > vi(f). Also, since f ′ ∈ F (f), there must exist a mapping λ : Θ → Θ such
that f ′(θ) = f(λ(θ)) for all θ. Consider the following strategy profile σ′: for any i, g,
and θ, (i) σ′i(h, g, θ) = σ
∗
i (h, g, θ) for any h ∈ Ht, t < τ ; (ii) for any h ∈ Ht, t ≥ τ ,
σ′i(h, g, θ) = σ
∗
i (h, g, λ(θ)) if h is such that there has been no deviation from σ
′, while
σ′i(h, g, θ) = σ
∗
i (h, g, θ) otherwise.
Given the construction of σ′, and since σ∗ ∈ Ωδ(R∗) and piθ(t)i (σ′, R) = v′i > vi for all
i, t ≥ τ and θ(t), no agent wants to deviate from σ′ at any history before period τ . Next,
fix any i, t ≥ τ , θ(t) and θt. By the construction of σ′, and since σ∗ repeated-implements
f from τ , we also have that agent i’s continuation payoff from σ′ at h(θ(t), σ′, R∗) after
observing θt is given by
(1− δ)ui
(
aθ(t),θ
t
(σ′, R∗), θt
)
+ δvi(f
′). (2)
10Note that the necessary condition implied by this statement would correspond to efficiency in the
range if V (f) was a convex set (which would be true, for instance, if public randomization were allowed).
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On the other hand, the corresponding payoff from any unilateral one-period deviation
m′i ∈Mi(θ(t), σ′, R∗) by i from σ′ is
(1− δ)ui
(
ψθ(t)(m′i,m
θ(t),θt
−i (σ
′, R∗)), θt
)
+ δpi
θ(t),θt
i (σ
′)|m′i. (3)
Notice that, by the construction of σ′, there exists some θ˜(t) such that h(θ(t), σ′, R∗) =
h(θ˜(t), σ∗, R∗) and, hence, Mi(θ(t), σ′, R∗)) = Mi(θ˜(t), σ∗, R∗). Moreover, after a devia-
tion, σ′ induces the same continuation strategies as σ∗. Thus, we have
pi
θ(t),θt
i (σ
′)|m′i = piθ˜(t),λ(θ
t)
i (σ
∗)|m′i.
Then, by (1) above, the deviation payoff (3) is less than or equal to
(1− δ)
[
ui
(
ψθ(t)(m′i,m
θ(t),θt
−i (σ
′, R∗)), θt
)
+ ρ
]
+ δvi(f).
This, together with vi(f
′) > vi(f), δ > δ¯ and the definition of δ¯, implies that (2) exceeds
(3). But, this means that σ′ ∈ Ωδ(R∗). Since σ′ induces an average payoff vi(f ′) 6= vi(f)
for all i from period τ, we then have a contradiction against the assumption that R∗
repeated-implements f from τ .
3.3.2 Sufficiency
Let us now investigate if an efficient SCF can indeed be repeatedly implemented. We
begin with some additional definitions and an important general observation.
First, we call a trivial mechanism one that enforces a single outcome. Formally,
φ(a) = (M,ψ) is such that Mi = {∅} for all i and ψ(m) = a ∈ A for all m ∈ M .
Also, let d(i) denote a dictatorial mechanism in which agent i is the dictator; formally,
d(i) = (M,ψ) is such that Mi = A, Mj = {∅} for all j 6= i and ψ(m) = mi for all m ∈M .
Next, let vii =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) maxa∈A ui(a, θ) denote agent i’s maximal one-period pay-
off. Clearly, vii is i’s payoff when i is the dictator and he acts rationally. Also, let
Ai(θ) ≡ {arg maxa∈A ui(a, θ)} represent the set of i’s best outcomes in state θ. Then,
define the maximum payoff i can obtain when agent j 6= i is the dictator by vji =∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) maxa∈Aj(θ) ui(a, θ).
We make the following assumption throughout the paper.
(A) There exist some i and j such that Ai(θ) ∩ Aj(θ) is empty for some θ.
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This assumption is equivalent to assuming that vii 6= vji for some i and j. It implies that
in some state there is a conflict between some agents on the best outcome. Since we are
concerned with repeated implementation of efficient SCFs, Assumption (A) incurs no loss
of generality when each agent has a unique best outcome for each state: if Assumption
(A) were not to hold, we could then simply let any agent choose the outcome in each
period to obtain repeated implementation of an efficient SCF.
Our results on efficient repeated implementation below are based on the following
relatively innocuous auxiliary condition.
Condition ω. For each i, there exists some a˜i ∈ A such that vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i).
This property says that, for each agent, the expected utility that he derives from the
SCF is bounded below by that of some constant SCF.11 Note that the property does not
require that there be a single constant SCF to provide the lower bound for all agents. In
many applications, condition ω is naturally satisfied.
Now, let Φa denote a stationary regime in which the trivial mechanism φ(a) is repeated
forever and let Di denote a stationary regime in which the dictatorial mechanism d(i) is
repeated forever. Also, let S(i, a) be the set of all possible history-independent regimes in
which the enforced mechanisms are either d(i) or φ(a) only. For any i, j ∈ I, a ∈ A and
Si ∈ S(i, a), we denote by pij(Si) the maximum payoff j can obtain when Si is enforced
and agent i always chooses a best outcome in the dictatorial mechanism d(i).12
Our first Lemma applies the result of Sorin [27] to our setup. If an SCF satisfies con-
dition ω, any individual’s corresponding payoff can be generated precisely by a sequence
of appropriate dictatorial and trivial mechanisms, as long as the discount factor is greater
than a half.
Lemma 1 Consider an SCF f and any i. Suppose that there exists some a˜i ∈ A such
that vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i). Then, for any δ ≥ 12 , there exists a regime Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) such that
pii(S
i) = vi(f).
Proof. By assumption there exists some outcome a˜i such that vi(f) ∈ [vi(a˜i), vii]. Since
vi(a˜
i) is the one-period payoff of i when φ(a) is played and vii is i’s payoff when d(i) is
11We later discuss an alternative requirement, which we call non-exclusion, that can serve the same
purpose as condition ω in our analysis.
12Note when the best choice of i is not unique in some state then the payoff of any j 6= i may depend
on the precise choice of i when i is the dictator.
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played and i behaves rationally, it follows from the algorithm of Sorin [27] (see Lemma
3.7.1 of Mailath and Samuelson [16]) that there exists a regime Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) that alternates
between φ(a) and d(i), and generates the payoff vi(f) exactly.
The above statement assumes that δ ≥ 1
2
because vi(f) is a convex combination of
exactly two payoffs vi(a˜
i) and vii. For the remainder of the paper, unless otherwise stated,
δ will be fixed to be no less than 1
2
as required by this Lemma. But, note that if the
environment is sufficiently rich that, for each i, one can find some a˜i with vi(a˜
i) = vi(f)
(for instance, when utilities are transferable) then our results below are true for any
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Three or more agents The analysis with three or more agents is somewhat different
from that with two players. Here, we consider the former case and assume that I > 2 .
Our arguments are constructive. First, fix any SCF f that satisfies condition ω and
define mechanism g∗ = (M,ψ) as follows: Mi = Θ × Z+ for all i, and ψ is such that (i)
if mi = (θ, ·) for at least I − 1 agents, ψ(m) = f(θ) and (ii) if m = ((θi, zi))i∈I is of any
other type, ψ(m) = f(θ˜) for some arbitrary but fixed state θ˜ ∈ Θ.
Next, let R∗ denote any regime satisfying the following transition rules: R∗(∅) = g∗
and, for any h = ((g1,m1), . . . , (gt−1,mt−1)) ∈ H t such that t > 1 and gt−1 = g∗,
1. if mt−1i = (·, 0) for all i, R∗(h) = g∗;
2. if there exists some i such that mt−1j = (·, 0) for all j 6= i and mt−1i = (·, zi) with
zi > 0, R∗|h = Si, where Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) such that vi(a˜i) ≤ vi(f) and pii(Si) = vi(f)
(by condition ω and Lemma 1, regime Si exists);
3. if mt−1 is of any other type and i is lowest-indexed agent among those who announce
the highest integer, R∗|h = Di.
Regime R∗ starts with mechanism g∗. At any period in which this mechanism is played,
the transition is as follows. If all agents anounce zero integer, then the mechanism next
period continues to be g∗. If all agents but one, say i, anounce zero integer and i does
not, then the continuation regime at the next period is a history-independent regime in
which the odd-one-out i can guarantee himself a payoff exactly equal to the target level
vi(f) (invoking Lemma 1). Finally, if the message profile is of any other type, one of the
agents who announce the highest integer becomes a dictator forever thereafter.
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Note that, unless all agents “agree” on zero integer when playing mechanism g∗, any
strategic play in regime R∗ effectively ends; for any other message profile, the continuation
regime is history-independent and employs only dictatorial and/or trivial mechanisms.
We now characterize the set of Nash equilibria of regime R∗. A critical feature of
our regime construction is conveyed in our next Lemma: beyond the first period, as long
as g∗ is the mechanism played, each agent i’s equilibrium continuation payoff is always
bounded below by the target payoff vi(f). This follows from pii(S
i) = vi(f) (Lemma 1).
Lemma 2 Suppose that f satisfies condition ω. Fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗). For any t > 1 and
θ(t), if gθ(t)(σ,R∗) = g∗, piθ(t)i (σ,R
∗) ≥ vi(f) for all i.
Proof. Suppose not; then, at some t > 1 and θ(t), pi
θ(t)
i (σ,R
∗) < vi(f) for some i. Let
θ(t) = (θ(t − 1), θt−1). By the transition rules of R∗, it must be that gθ(t−1)(σ,R∗) = g∗
and, for all i, m
θ(t−1),θt−1
i (σ,R
∗) = (θi, 0) for some θi.
Consider agent i deviating to another strategy σ′i identical to the equilibrium strategy
σi at every history, except at h(θ(t − 1), σ, R∗) and period t − 1 state θt−1 where it
announces the state announced by σi, θi, and a positive integer. Given ψ of mechanism
g∗, the outcome at (h(θ(t− 1), σ, R∗), θt−1) does not change, aθ(t−1),θt−1(σ′i, σ−i, R∗) =
aθ(t−1),θ
t−1
(σ,R∗), while, by transition rule 2 of R∗, regime Si will be played thereafter
and i can obtain continuation payoff vi(f) at the next period. Thus, the deviation is
profitable, contradicting the Nash equilibrium assumption.
We next want to show that indeed mechanism g∗ will always be played on the equi-
librium path. To this end, we also assume that a˜i ∈ A used in the construction of Si (in
the definition of R∗ above) is such that
if vi(f) = vi(a˜
i) then vjj > vj(a˜
i) for some j. (4)
Condition (4) ensures that, in any equilibrium, agents will always agree and, therefore,
g∗ will always be played, implementing outcomes belonging only to the range of f .
Lemma 3 Suppose that f satisfies ω. Also, suppose that, for each i, outcome a˜i ∈ A used
in the construction of Si above satisfies (4). Then, for any σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), t, θ(t) and θt, we
have: (i) gθ(t)(σ,R∗) = g∗; (ii) mθ(t),θ
t
i (σ,R
∗) = (·, 0) for all i; (iii) aθ(t),θt(σ,R∗) ∈ f(Θ).
Proof. First we establish two claims.
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Claim 1 : Fix any i and any ai(θ) ∈ Ai(θ) for every θ. There exists j 6= i such that
vjj >
∑
θ p(θ)uj(a
i(θ), θ).
To prove this claim, suppose otherwise; then vjj =
∑
θ p(θ)uj(a
i(θ), θ) for all j 6= i.
But this means that ai(θ) ∈ Aj(θ) for all j 6= i and θ. Since by assumption ai(θ) ∈ Ai(θ),
this contradicts Assumption (A).
Claim 2 : Fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), t, θ(t) and θt. If gθ(t) = b∗ and mθ(t),θti = (·, zi) with
zi > 0 for some i then there must exist some j 6= i such that piθ(t),θtj < vjj .
To prove this claim note that, given the definition of R∗, the continuation regime at
the next period is either Di or Si for some i. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: The continuation regime is Si = Φa˜
i
(Si enforces a˜i ∈ A at every period).
In this case pi
θ(t),θt
i = vi(f) = vi(a˜
i). Then the claim follows from pi
θ(t),θt
j = vj(a˜
i) and
condition (4).
Case 2: The continuation regime is either Di or Si 6= Φa˜i .
By assumption under d(i) every agent j receives at most vij ≤ vjj . Also, when the
trivial mechanism φ(a˜i) is played every agent j receives a payoff vj(a˜
i) ≤ vjj . Since in
this case the continuation regime involves playing either d(i) or φ(a˜i), it follows that, for
every j, pi
θ(t),θt
j ≤ vjj . Furthermore, by Claim 1, it must be that this inequality is strict
for some j 6= i. This is because in this case there exists some t′ > t and some sequence of
states θ(t′) = (θ(t), θt+1, ..θt
′−1) such that the continuation regime enforces d(i) at history
h(θ(t′)); but then aθ(t
′),θ ∈ Ai(θ) for all θ and therefore, by Claim 1, there exists an agent
j 6= i such that vjj >
∑
θ p(θ)uj(a
θ(t′),θ, θ).
Next note that, given the definitions of g∗ and R∗, to prove the lemma it suffices to
show the following: For any t and θ(t), if gθ(t) = g∗ then mθ(t),θ
t
i = (·, 0) for all i and θt.
To show this, suppose otherwise; so, at some t and θ(t), gθ(t) = b∗ but mθ(t),θ
t
i = (·, zi)
with zi > 0 for some i and θt. Then by Claim 2 there exists j 6= i such that piθ(t),θtj < vjj .
Next consider j deviating to another strategy which yields the same outcome path as the
equilibrium strategy, σj, at every history, except at (h(θ(t)), θ
t) where it announces the
state announced by σi and an integer higher than any integer that can be reported by σ at
this history. Given ψ, such a deviation does not incur a one-period utility loss while strictly
improving the continuation payoff as of the next period since the deviator j becomes a
dictator himself and by the previous argument pi
θ(t),θt
j < v
j
j . This is a contradiction.
Given the previous two lemmas, we can now pin down the equilibrium payoffs by
invoking efficiency in the range.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that f is efficient in the range and satisfies condition ω. Also, suppose
that, for each i, outcome a˜i ∈ A used in the construction of Si above satisfies (4). Then,
for any σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), piθ(t)i (σ,R∗) = vi(f) for any i, t > 1 and θ(t).
Proof. Suppose not; then f is efficient in the range but there exist some σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), t > 1
and θ(t) such that pi
θ(t)
i 6= vi(f) for some i. By Lemma 2, it must be that piθ(t)i > vi(f).
Also, by part (iii) of Lemma 3,
(
pi
θ(t)
j
)
j∈I
∈ co(V (f)). Since f is efficient in the range, it
then follows that there must exist some j 6= i such that piθ(t)j < vj(f). But, this contradicts
Lemma 2.
It is straightforward to establish that regime R∗ has a Nash equilibrium in Markov
strategies which attains truth-telling and, hence, the desired social choice at every possible
history.
Lemma 5 Suppose that f satisfies condition ω. There exists σ∗ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), which is
Markov, such that, for any t, θ(t) and θt, (i) gθ(t)(σ∗, R∗) = g∗; (ii) aθ(t),θ
t
(σ∗, R∗) = f(θt).
Proof. Consider σ∗ ∈ Σ such that, for all i, σ∗i (h, g∗, θ) = σ∗i (h′, g∗, θ) = (θ, 0) for any
h,h′ ∈ H∞ and θ. Thus, at any t and θ(t), we have piθ(t)i (σ∗, R∗) = vi(f) for all i. Consider
any i making a unilateral deviation from σ∗ by choosing some σ′i 6= σ∗i which announces a
different message at some (θ(t), θt). But, given ψ of g∗, it follows that aθ(t),θ
t
(σ′i, σ
∗
−i, R
∗) =
aθ(t),θ
t
(σ∗, R∗) = f(θt) while, by transition rule 2 of R∗, piθ(t),θ
t
i (σ
′
i, σ
∗
−i, R
∗) = vi(f). Thus,
the deviation is not profitable.13
We are now ready to present our main results for the complete information case. The
first result requires a slight strenghtening of condition ω in order to ensure implementation
of SCFs that are efficient in the range.
Condition ω′. For each i, there exists some a˜i ∈ A such that
(a) vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i) and
(b) if vi(f) = vi(a˜
i) then either (i) there exists j such that vjj > vj(a˜
i) or (ii) the
payoff profile v(a˜i) does not Pareto dominate v(f).
13In the Nash equilibrium constructed for R∗, each agent is indifferent between the equilibrium and any
unilateral deviation. The following modification to regime R∗ will admit a strict Nash equilibrium with
the same properties: for each i, construct Si such that i obtains a payoff vi(f) −  for some arbitrarily
small  > 0. This will, however, result in the equilibrium payoffs of our canonical regime to approximate
the efficient target payoffs.
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Note that the additional requirement (b) in ω′ that does not appear in condition ω
applies only if vi(f) = vi(a˜
i).
Theorem 2 Suppose that I ≥ 3, and consider an SCF f satisfying condition ω′. If f is
efficient in the range, it is payoff-repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium from period
2; if f is strictly efficient in the range, it is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium
from period 2.
Proof. Consider any profile of outcomes (a˜1, . . . , a˜I) satisfying condition ω′. There are
two cases to consider.
Case 1: For all i, a˜i ∈ A satisfies (4). In this case the first part of the theorem follows
immediately from Lemmas 4 and 5.
To prove the second part, fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R∗), i, t > 1 and θ(t). Then
pi
θ(t)
i =
∑
θt∈Θ
p(θt)
[
(1− δ)ui(aθ(t),θt , θt) + δpiθ(t),θ
t
i
]
. (5)
Also, by Lemma 4 we have pi
θ(t)
i = vi(f) and pi
θ(t),θt
i = vi(f) for any θ
t. But then, by (5),
we have
∑
θt p(θ
t)ui(a
θ(t),θt , θt) = vi(f). Since, by part (iii) of Lemma 3, a
θ(t),θt ∈ f(Θ),
and since f is strictly efficient in the range, the claim follows.
Case 2: For some i, condition (4) does not hold.
In this case, vi(f) = vi(a˜
i) and vjj = vj(a˜
i) for all j 6= i. Then, by b(ii) of condition ω′,
v(a˜i) does not Pareto dominate v(f). Since vjj ≥ vj(f), it must then be that vj(f) = vj(a˜i)
for all j. Such an SCF can be trivially payoff-repeated-implemented via Φa˜
i
. Furthermore,
since vj(f) = vj(a˜
i) = vjj for all j, f is efficient. Thus, if f is strictly efficient (in the range),
it must be constant, i.e. f(θ) = a˜i for all θ, and hence can also be repeated-implemented
via Φa˜
i
.
Note that when f is efficient (over the entire set of SCFs) part b(ii) of condition ω′ is
vacuously satisfied. Therefore, we can use condition ω instead of ω′ to establish repeated
implementation with efficiency.
Corollary 1 Suppose that I ≥ 3, and consider an SCF f satisfying condition ω. If f
is efficient, it is payoff-repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium from period 2; if f is
strictly efficient, it is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium from period 2.
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Note that Theorem 2 and its Corollary establish repeated implementation from the
second period and, therefore, unwanted outcomes may still be implemented in the first
period. This point will be discussed in more detail in Section 5 below.
Two agents As in one-shot Nash implementation (Moore and Repullo [24] and Dutta
and Sen [10]), the two-agent case brings non-trivial differences to the analysis. In partic-
ular, with three or more agents a unilateral deviation from “consensus” can be detected;
with two agents, however, it is not possible to identify the misreport in the event of dis-
agreement. In our repeated implementation setup, this creates a difficulty in establishing
existence of an equilibrium in the canonical regime.
As identified by Dutta and Sen [10], a necessary condition for existence of an equi-
librium in the one-shot setup is a self-selection requirement that ensures the availabil-
ity of a punishment whenever the two players disagree on their announcements of the
state but one of them is telling the truth. We show below that, with two agents,
such a condition together with condition ω, or ω′, delivers repeated implementation of
an SCF that is efficient, or efficient in the range. Formally, for any f , i and θ, let
Li(θ) = {a ∈ A|ui(a, θ) ≤ ui(f(θ), θ)} be the set of outcomes that are no better than f
for agent i. We say that f satisfies self-selection if L1(θ) ∩ L2 (θ′) 6= ∅ for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Theorem 3 Suppose that I = 2, and consider an SCF f satisfying condition ω (ω′)
and self-selection. If f is efficient (in the range), it is payoff-repeated-implementable in
Nash equilibrium from period 2; if f is strictly efficient (in the range), it is repeated-
implementable in Nash equilibrium from period 2.
The proof of the above theorem is relegated to the Appendix. We note that self-
selection and condition ω are weaker than the condition appearing in Moore and Repullo
[24] which requires the existence of an outcome that is strictly worse for both players in
every state; with self-selection the requirement is that for each pair of states there exists
an outcome such that, in those two states, neither player is better off compared with what
each would obtain with f .
A similar result can be obtained with an alternative condition to self-selection. We
show in the Supplementary Material that, with sufficiently patient agents, the two require-
ments of self-selection and condition ω′ needed to establish repeated implementation of an
SCF that is efficient in the range in Theorem 3 above can be replaced by an assumption
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that stipulates the existence of an outcome a˜ that is strictly worse than f on average for
both players: vi(a˜) < vi(f) for all i = 1, 2.
4 Incomplete information
4.1 The Setup
We now extend our analysis to incorporate incomplete information. An implementation
problem with incomplete information is denoted by P˜ = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ], and this
modifies the previous definition, P , with the following additions: Θ = Πi∈IΘi is a finite
set of states, where Θi denotes the finite set of agent i’s types ; let θ−i ≡ (θj)j 6=i and
Θ−i ≡ Πj 6=iΘj; p denotes a probability distribution defined on Θ (such that p(θ) > 0 for
each θ); for each i, let pi(θi) =
∑
θ−i p(θ−i, θi) be the marginal probability of type θi and
pi(θ−i|θi) = p(θ−i, θi)/pi(θi) be the conditional probability of θ−i given θi.
The one-period utility function for i is defined as before by ui : Θ × A → R and the
interim expected utility/payoff of outcome a to agent i of type θi is given by vi(a|θi) =∑
θ−i∈Θ−i pi(θ−i|θi)ui(a, θ−i, θi). Ex ante payoff of outcome a is then defined by vi(a) =∑
θi∈Θi vi(a|θi)p(θi). Similarly, with slight abuse of notation, define respectively the in-
terim and ex ante payoffs of an SCF f : Θ → A to agent i of type θi by vi(f |θi) =∑
θ−i∈Θ−i pi(θ−i|θi)ui(f(θ−i, θi), θ−i, θi) and vi(f) =
∑
θi∈Θi vi(f |θi)p(θi). Also, define the
maximum (ex ante) payoff that agent i can obtain if he were a dictator by
vii =
∑
θi∈Θi
pi(θi)
max
a∈A
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i|θi)ui(a, θ−i, θi)
 .
Note that as in the complete information case vii ≥ vi(f) for all i and f ∈ F . The
definition of an efficient SCF remains as before.
An infinitely repeated implementation problem, P˜∞, represents infinite repetitions of
P˜ = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ]. In each period, the state is drawn from Θ from an independent
and identical probability distribution p; each agent observes only his own type. As in
the complete information case, each agent evaluates an infinite outcome sequence, a∞ =(
at,θ
)
t∈Z++,θ∈Θ, according to discounted average expected utilities.
As before, let θ(t) = (θ1, . . . , θt−1) ∈ Θt−1 denote a sequence of realized states up
to, but not including, period t with θ(1) = ∅, and q(θ(t)) ≡ p(θ1) × · · · × p(θt−1). The
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definition of a regime also remains as before, with H∞ denoting the set of all possible
publicly observable histories (of mechanisms and messages). To define a strategy, let
Hti = (E ×Θi)t−1, where H1i = ∅, and H∞i = ∪∞t=1Hti with its typical element denoted by
hi. Then, for any regime R, each agent i’s strategy, σi, is a mapping σi : H
∞
i ×G×Θi →
∪g∈GM gi such that σi(hi, g, θi) ∈ M gi for any (hi, g, θi) ∈ H∞i × G × Θi. Let Σi be
the set of all such strategies and Σ ≡ Σ1 × · · · × ΣI . A Markov strategy (profile) can
be defined similarly as before. Note that here we are considering the general case with
private strategies; our results also hold with public strategies that depend only on publicly
observable histories.
Next, for any regime R and strategy profile σ ∈ Σ, we define the following on the
outcome path:
• hi(θ(t), σ, R) ∈ Hti denotes the t−1 period history that agent i observes if all agents
play R according to σ and the state/type profile realizations are θ(t) ∈ Θt−1; also
let h(θ(t), σ, R) = [hi(θ(t), σ, R)]i∈I .
• gθ(t)(σ,R) denotes the mechanism played at h(θ(t), σ, R).
• mθ(t),θt(σ,R) denotes the message profile reported and aθ(t),θt(σ,R) denotes the out-
come implemented at h(θ(t), σ, R) when the current state is θt.
• µi
(
θ˜(t)|θ(t), σ, R
)
denotes agent i’s posterior belief about the other agents’ past
types, θ˜(t) ∈ Θt−1, conditional on observing hi(θ(t), σ, R) and all playing according
to σ. Thus, µi
(
θ˜(t)|θ(t), σ, R
)
corresponds to the following probability ratio:
Pr
(
hi(θ(t), σ, R) | θ˜(t)
)
q
(
θ˜(t)
)
/Pr (hi(θ(t), σ, R)) .
• Eθ(t)piτi (σ,R) denotes agent i’s expected continuation payoff (i.e. discounted average
expected utility) at period τ ≥ t conditional on observing hi(θ(t), σ, R) and all
playing according to σ. Thus, Eθ(t)pi
τ
i (σ,R) is given by
(1−δ)
∑
θ˜(t)
∑
s≥τ
∑
θ(s−t+1)
∑
θs
δs−τq (θ(s− t+ 1), θs)µi
(
θ˜(t)|θ(t), σ, R
)
ui
(
aθ˜(t),θ(s−t+1),θ
s
(σ,R), θs
)
,
where, as before, δ stands for the common discount factor. For simplicity, let
Eθ(1)pi
τ
i (σ,R) = Epi
τ
i (σ,R) and Epi
1
i (σ,R) = pii(σ,R).
When the meaning is clear, we shall sometimes suppress the arguments in the above
variables and refer to them simply as hi(θ(t)), g
θ(t), mθ(t),θ
t
, aθ(t),θ
t
and Eθ(t)pi
τ
i .
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4.2 Bayesian repeated implementation
The standard solution concept for implementation with incomplete information is Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. In our repeated setup, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of R if, for any i, pii (σ,R) ≥ pii (σ′i, σ−i, R) for all σ′i. Let Qδ(R) denote
the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of regime R with discount factor δ. Similarly to the
complete information case, we propose the following notions of repeated implementation
for the incomplete information case.
Definition 4 An SCF f is payoff-repeated-implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
from period τ if there exists a regime R such that (i) Qδ(R) is non-empty; and (ii) every
σ ∈ Qδ(R) is such that, for every t ≥ τ , Epiti(σ,R) = vi(f) for any i. An SCF f is
repeated-implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium from period τ if, in addition, every
σ ∈ Qδ(R) is such that aθ(t),θt(σ,R) = f(θt) for any θ(t) and θt.
Note that the definition of payoff implementation above is written in terms of expected
future payoffs evaluated at the beginning of a regime. This is because we want to avoid
the issue of agents’ ex post private beliefs that affect their continuation payoffs at different
histories.
As in the complete information case, to implement an efficient SCF in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, we assume condition ω: for each i there exists a˜i ∈ A such that vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i).
This condition enables us to extend Lemma 1 above to the incomplete information setup.
That is, given any SCF f satisfying condition ω, and any i, one can construct a history-
independent regime Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) such that pii(Si) = vi(f).
In addition to condition ω, here we introduce one additional minor condition.
Condition υ. There exist i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, such that vi(f) < vii and vj(f) < vjj .
This property requires that there be at least two agents who prefer to be dictators
than to have the SCF implemented.
Our main sufficiency result builds on constructing the following regime defined for an
SCF f that satisfies condition ω. First, mechanism b∗ = (M,ψ) is defined such that (i)
for all i, Mi = Θi×Z+; and (ii) for any m = ((θi, zi))i∈I , ψ(m) = f(θ1, . . . , θI). Then, let
B∗ represent any regime satisfying the following transition rules: B∗(∅) = b∗ and, for any
h = ((g1,m1), . . . , (gt−1,mt−1)) ∈ H t such that t > 1 and gt−1 = b∗,
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1. if mt−1i = (θi, 0) for all i, then B
∗(h) = b∗;
2. if there exists some i such that mt−1j = (θj, 0) for all j 6= i and mt−1i = (θi, zi)
with zi 6= 0, then B∗|h = Si, where Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) such that vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i) and
pii(S
i) = vi(f) (by ω and Lemma 1, regime S
i exists);
3. if mt−1 is of any other type and i is the lowest-indexed agent among those who
announce the highest integer, then B∗|h = Di.
This regime is similar to the regimes constructed for the complete information case. It
starts with mechanism b∗ in which each agent reports his type and a non-negative integer.
Strategic interaction is maintained, and mechanism b∗ continues to be played, only if every
agent reports zero integer. If an agent reports a non-zero integer, this odd-one-out can
obtain a continuation payoff at the next period exactly equal to what he would obtain
from implementation of the SCF. If two or more agents report non-zero integers then the
one announcing the highest integer becomes a dictator forever as of the next period.
Characterizing the properties of a Bayesian equilibrium of this regime is complicated
by the presence of incomplete information, compared to the corresponding task in the
complete information setup. First, at any given history, we obtain a lower bound on each
agent’s expected equilibrium continuation payoff at the next period. This contrasts with
the corresponding result with complete information, Lemma 2, which calculates the lower
bound for the actual continuation payoff at any period. With incomplete information,
each player i does not know the private information held by others and, therefore, the (off-
the-equilibrium) possibility of continuation regime Si, which guarantees the continuation
payoff vi(f), delivers a lower bound on equilibrium payoff only in expectation.
Lemma 6 Suppose that f satisfies ω. Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗). For any t and θ(t), if
gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗, Eθ(t)pit+1i (σ,B
∗) ≥ vi(f) for all i.
Proof. Suppose not; so, at some θ(t), gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗ but Eθ(t)pit+1i (σ,B
∗) < vi(f) for
some i. Then, consider i deviating to another strategy σ′i identical to the equilibrium
strategy σi at every history, except at hi(θ(t), σ, B
∗) where, for each current period real-
ization of θi, it reports the same type as σi but a different integer which is higher than
any integer that can be reported by σ at such a history.
By the definition of b∗, such a deviation does not alter the current period’s implemented
outcome, regardless of the others’ types. As of the next period, it results in either i
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becoming a dictator forever (transition rule 3 of B∗) or continuation regime Si (transition
rule 2). Since vii ≥ vi(f) and i can obtain continuation payoff vi(f) from Si, the deviation
is profitable, implying a contradiction.
Second, since we allow for private strategies that depend on each individual’s past
types, continuation payoffs depend on the agents’ posterior beliefs about others’ past
types and, therefore, a profile of continuation payoffs do not necessarily belong to co(V ).
Nonetheless, the profile of payoffs evaluated at the beginning of t = 1 must belong to
co(V ) and we can impose efficiency to find upper bounds for such payoffs. From this, it
can be shown that continuation payoffs evaluated at any later date must also be bounded
above.
Lemma 7 Suppose that f is efficient and satisfies conditions ω. Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗) and
any date t. Also, suppose that gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗ for all θ(t). Then, Eθ(t)pit+1i (σ,B
∗) = vi(f)
for any i and θ(t).14
Proof. Since gθ(t) = b∗ for all θ(t), it immediately follows from Lemma 6 and Bayes rule
that, for all i,
Epit+1i =
∑
θ(t)
Pr (hi(θ(t)))Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i ≥ vi(f). (6)
Since
(
Epit+1i
)
i∈I ∈ co(V ) and f is efficient, (6) then implies that Epit+1i = vi(f) for all i.
By Lemma 6, this in turn implies that Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i = vi(f) for any i and θ(t).
It remains to be shown that mechanism b∗ must always be played along any equilibrium
path. Since the regime begins with b∗, we can apply induction to derive this, once next
Lemma has been established.
Lemma 8 Suppose that f is efficient and satisfies conditions ω and υ. Fix any σ ∈
Qδ(B∗). Also, fix any t, and suppose that gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗ for all θ(t). Then, gθ(t),θ
t
(σ,B∗) =
b∗ for any θ(t) and θt.
14Note that Lemma 7 ties down expected continuation payoffs along the equilibrium path at any period t
by assuming that the mechanism played in the corresponding period is b∗ for all possible state realizations
up to t. It imposes no restriction on the mechanisms beyond t. As a result, outcomes that lie outside of
the range of f may arise. This is why this Lemma (and thereby all the Bayesian implementation results
below) requires the SCF to be efficient and not just efficient in the range.
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Proof. Suppose not; so, for some t, gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗ for all θ(t) but mθ(t),θ
t
i (σ,B
∗) = (·, z),
z 6= 0, for some i, θ(t) and θt. By condition υ, there must exist some j 6= i such that
vjj > vj(f). Consider j deviating to another strategy identical to the equilibrium strategy,
σj, except that, at hj(θ(t), σ, B
∗), it reports the same type as σj for each current realization
of θj but a different integer higher than any integer reported by σ at such a history.
By the definition of b∗, the deviation does not alter the current outcome, regardless
of the others’ types. But, the continuation regime is Dj if the realized type profile is
θt while, otherwise, it is Dj or Sj. In the former case, j can obtain continuation payoff
vjj > vj(f); in the latter, he can obtain at least vj(f). Since, by Lemma 7, the equilibrium
continuation payoff is vj(f), the deviation is thus profitable, implying a contradiction.
This leads to the following.
Lemma 9 If f is efficient and satisfies conditions ω and υ, every σ ∈ Qδ(B∗) is such
that Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i (σ,B
∗) = vi(f) for any i, t and θ(t).
Proof. Since B∗(∅) = b∗, it follows by induction from Lemma 8 that, for any t and θ(t),
gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗. Lemma 7 then completes the proof.
Our objective of Bayesian repeated implementation is now achieved if regime B∗
admits an equilibrium. One natural sufficiency condition that will guarantee existence
in our setup is incentive compatibility: f is incentive compatible if, for any i and θi,
vi(f |θi) ≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i pi(θ−i|θi)ui(f(θ−i, θ′i), (θ−i, θi)) for all θ′i ∈ Θi. It is straightforward to
see that, if f is incentive compatible, B∗ admits a Markov Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which each agent always reports his true type and zero integer. Together with Lemma 9,
this immediately leads to our next Theorem.
Theorem 4 Fix any I ≥ 2. If f is efficient, incentive compatible and satisfies conditions
ω and υ, f is payoff-repeated-implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium from period 2.
In the previous section with complete information, to obtain the stronger implemen-
tation result in terms of outcomes, we strenghtened the efficiency notion by requiring, in
addition, that there is no SCF f ′ 6= f such that vi(f) = vi(f ′) for all i. Here, we need to
assume the following to obtain outcome implementation.
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Condition χ. There exists no γ : Θ×Θ→ A such that
vi(f) =
∑
θ,θ′∈Θ
p(θ)p(θ′)ui (γ(θ, θ′), θ′) for all i.
Corollary 2 In addition to the conditions in Theorem 4, suppose f satisfies condition χ.
Then f is repeated-implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium from period 2.
Proof. Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), i, t and θ(t). Then we have
Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i =
∑
θt∈Θ
p(θt)
[
(1− δ)
∑
θt+1∈Θ
p
(
θt+1
)
ui
(
aθ(t),θ
t,θt+1 , θt+1
)
+ δEθ(t),θtpi
t+2
i
]
. (7)
But, by Lemma 9, Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i = vi(f) and Eθ(t),θtpi
t+2
i = vi(f) for any θ
t. Thus, (7) implies
that
∑
θt,θt+1 p(θ
t)p(θt+1)ui
(
aθ(t),θ
t,θt+1 , θt+1
)
= vi(f). This contradicts condition χ.
4.3 More on incentive compatibility
Theorem 4 and its Corollary establish Bayesian repeated implementation of an efficient
SCF without (Bayesian) monotonicity but they still assume incentive compatibility to
ensure existence of an equilibrium in which every agent always reports his true type. We
now explore if it is in fact possible to construct a regime that keeps the desired equilibrium
properties and admits such an equilibrium without incentive compatibility.
Interdependent values Many authors have identified a conflict between efficiency and
incentive compatibility in the one-shot setup with interdependent values in which some
agents’ utilities depend on others’ private information. (for instance, Maskin [17] and
Jehiel and Moldovanu [14]). Thus, it is of particular interest that we establish non-
necessity of incentive compatibility for repeated implementation in this case.
Let us assume that the agents know their utilities from the implemented outcomes at
the end of each period, and define identifiability as follows.
Definition 5 An SCF f is identifiable if, for any i, θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi such that θ′i 6= θi and
θ−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists some j 6= i such that uj(f(θ′i, θ−i), θ′i, θ−i) 6= uj(f(θ′i, θ−i), θi, θ−i).
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In words, identifiability requires that, whenever there is one agent lying about his type
while all others report their types truthfully, there exists another agent who obtains a
(one-period) utility different from what he would have obtained under everyone behaving
truthfully.15 Thus, with an identifiable SCF, if an agent deviates from an equilibrium
in which all agents report their types truthfully then there will be at least one other
agent who can detect the lie at the end of the period. Notice that the above definition
does not require that the detector knows who has lied; he only learns that someone has.
Identifiability will enable us to build a regime which admits a truth-telling equilibrium
based on incentives of repeated play, instead of one-shot incentive compatibility of the
SCF. Such incentives involve punishment when someone misreports his type.
To allow the possibility of punishement we need to strenghten condition ω to allow for
the existence of an outcome that is strictly worse than the SCF. Specifically, we assume
the following.
Condition ω′′. There exists some a˜ ∈ A such that vi(a˜) < vi(f) for all i.16
Consider an SCF f that satisfies conditions ω′′ and υ. Define Z as a mechanism in
which (i) for all i, mi = Z+; and (ii) for all m, ψ(m) = a for some arbitrary but fixed a,
and define b˜∗ as the following extensive form mechanism:
• Stage 1 - Each agent i announces his private information θi, and f(θ1, . . . , θI) is
implemented.
• Stage 2 - Once agents learn their utilities, but before a new state is drawn, each
of them announces a report belonging to the set {NF,F} × Z+, where NF and F
refer to “no flag” and “flag” respectively.
The agents’ actions in Stage 2 do not affect the outcome implemented and payoffs in
the current period but they determine the continuation play in the regime below.17 Next
define regime B˜∗ to be such that B˜∗(∅) = Z and satisfies the following transition rules:
1. for any h = (g1,m1) ∈ H2,
15Notice that identifiability cannot hold with private values.
16Note that this property subsumes condition ω′.
17A similar mechanism design is considered by Mezzetti [22] in the one-shot context with interdependent
values and quasi-linear utilities.
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(a) if m1i = (0) for all i, then B˜
∗(h) = b˜∗;
(b) if there exists some i such that m1j = (0) for all j 6= i and m1i = zi with
zi 6= 0, then B˜∗|h = Si, where Si ∈ S(i, a˜)\φa˜ such that v(a˜) < v(f) and
pii(S
i) = vi(f) (by assumption ω
′′ and Lemma 1 regime Si exists);
(c) if m1 is of any other type and i is the lowest-indexed agent among those who
announce the highest integer, then B˜∗|h = Di;
2. for any h = ((g1,m1), . . . , (gt−1,mt−1)) ∈ H t such that t > 2 and gt−1 = b˜∗:
(a) if mt−1i is such that every agent reports NF and 0 in Stage 2, then B˜
∗(h) = b˜∗;
(b) if mt−1i is such that at least one agent reports F in Stage 2, then B˜
∗|h = Φa˜;
(c) if mt−1i is such that every agent reports NF and every agent except some i
announces 0, then B˜∗|h = Si, where Si is as in 1(b) above;
(d) if mt−1 is of any other type and i is the lowest-indexed agent among those who
announce the highest integer, then B˜∗|h = Di.
This regime begins with a simple integer mechanism and non-contingent implemen-
tation of an arbitrary outcome in the first period. If all agents report zero, then the
next period’s mechanism is b˜∗; otherwise, strategic interaction ends with the continuation
regime being either Si or Di for some i.
The new mechanism b˜∗ sets up two reporting stages. In particular, each agent is
endowed with an opportunity to report detection of a lie by raising “flag” (though he may
not know who the liar is) after an outcome has been implemented and his own within-
period payoff learned. The second stage also features integer play, with the transitions
being the same as before as long as every agent reports “no flag”. But, only one “flag”
is needed to overrule the integers and activate permanent implementation of outcome a˜
which yields a payoff lower than that of the SCF for every agent.
Several comments are worth pointing out about regime B˜∗. First, why do we employ
a two-stage mechanism b˜∗? This is because we want to find an equilibrium in which a
deviation from truth-telling can be identified and subsequently punished. This can be
done only after utilities are learned, via the choice of “flag”.
Second, the agents report an integer also in the second stage of mechanism b˜∗. Note
that either a positive integer or a flag leads to shutdown of strategic play in the regime.
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This means that if we let the integer play to occur before the choice of flag an agent
may deviate from truth-telling by reporting a false type and a positive integer, thereby
avoiding subsequent detection and punishment altogether.
Third, note that the initial mechanism enforces an arbitrary outcome and only integers
are reported. The integer play affects transitions such that the agents’ continuation
payoffs are bounded. We do not however allow for any strategic play towards first period
implementation in order to avoid potential incentive or coordination problems; otherwise,
one equilibrium may be that all players flag in period 1.
Next Lemma shows that Bayesian equilibria of regime B˜∗ exhibit the same payoff
properties as those of regime B∗ in Section 4.2 above and induce expected continuation
payoff profile v(f). This characterization result is obtained by applying similar arguments
to those leading to Lemma 9 above. The additional complication in deriving the result
for B˜∗ is that we also need to ensure that no agent flags on an equilibrium path. This is
achieved inductively by showing that expected continuation payoffs are v(f) and, hence,
efficient, whereas flaging induces inefficiency because the continuation payoff for each i
after flaging is vi(a˜) < vi(f) (see the Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 10 If f is efficient and satisfies conditions ω′′ and υ, every σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗) is such
that Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i (σ,B
∗) = vi(f) for any i, t and θ(t).
We next establish that, with an identifiable SCF, B˜∗ admits an Bayesian Nash equi-
librium that attains the desired outcome path with sufficiently patient agents.
Lemma 11 Suppose that f satisfies identifiability and condition ω′′. If δ is sufficiently
large, there exists σ∗ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗) such that, for any t > 1, θ(t) and θt, (i) gθ(t)(σ∗, B˜∗) = b˜∗;
and (ii) aθ(t),θ
t
(σ∗, B˜∗) = f(θt).
Proof. By condition ω′′ there exists some  > 0 such that, for each i, vi(a˜) < vi(f) − .
Define ρ ≡ maxi,θ,a,a′ [ui(a, θ)− ui(a′, θ)] and δ¯ ≡ ρρ+ . Fix any δ ∈
(
δ¯, 1
)
. Consider the
following symmetric strategy profile σ∗ ∈ Σ: for each i, σ∗i is such that:
• for any θi, σ∗i (∅, Z, θi) = 0;
• for any t > 1 and corresponding history, if b˜∗ is played in the period,
– in Stage 1, it always reports the true type;
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– in Stage 2, it reports NF and zero integer if the agent has not detected a false
report from another agent or has not made a false report himself in Stage 1;
otherwise, report F .
From these strategies, each agent i obtains continuation payoff vi(f) at the beginning
of each period t > 1. Let us now examine deviation by any agent i. First, consider
t = 1. Given the definition of mechanism Z and transition rule 1(b), announcing a
positive integer alters neither the current period’s outcome/payoff nor the continuation
payoff at the next period. Second, consider any t > 1 and any corresponding history on
the equilibrium path. Deviation can take place in two stages:
(i) Stage 1 - Announce a false type. But then, due to identifiability, another agent
will raise “flag” in Stage 2, thereby activating permanent implementation of a˜ as of the
next period. The corresponding continuation payoff cannot exceed (1−δ) maxa,θ ui(a, θ)+
δ(vi(f)− ), while the equilibrium payoff is at least (1− δ) mina,θ ui(a, θ) + δvi(f). Since
δ > δ¯, the latter exceeds the former, and the deviation is not profitable.
(ii) Stage 2 - Flag or anounce a non-zero integer following a stage 1 at which a no
agent provides a false report. But given transition rules 2(b) and 2(c), such deviations
cannot make i better off than no “flag” and zero integer.
Notice from the proof that the above equilibrium strategy profile is also sequentially
rational; in particular, in the Stage 2 continuation game following a false report (off-
the-equilibrium), it is indeed a best response by either the liar or the detector to “flag”
given that there will be another agent also doing the same. Furthermore, note that the
mutual optimality of this behavior is supported by an indifference argument; outcome a˜
is permanently implemented regardless of one’s response to another flag. This is in fact a
simplification. Since vi(a˜) < vi(f) for all i, for instance, the following modification to the
regime makes it strictly optimal for an agent to flag given that there is another flag: if
there is only one flag then the continuation regime simply implements a˜ forever, while if
two or more agents flag the continuation regime alternates between enforcement of a˜ and
dictatorships of those who flag such that those agents obtain payoffs greater than what
they would obtain from a˜ forever (but less than the payoffs from f).
Lemmas 10 and 11 immediately enable us to state the following.
Theorem 5 Consider the case of interdependent values. Suppose that f satisfies effi-
ciency, identifiability, and conditions ω′′ and υ. Then, we have the following: there exist
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a regime R and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) (i) the set Qδ(B˜∗) is non-empty
and (ii) every σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗) is such that Epiti(σ,R) = vi(f) for any i and for every t ≥ 2.
The above result establishes payoff implementation from period 2 when δ ∈ (δ¯, 1). By
the same reasoning as in the proof of Corollary 2, Theorem 5 can be extended to show
outcome implementation if in addition f satisfies condition χ.
Private values In order to use the incentives of repeated play to overcome incentive
compatibility, someone in the group must be able to detect a deviation and subsequently
enforce punishment. With interdependent values, this is possible once utilities are learned;
with private values, each agent’s utility depends only on his own type and hence identifi-
ability cannot hold.
One way to identify a deviation in the private value setup is to observe the distribution
of an agent’s type reports over a long horizon. By a law of large numbers, the distribution
of the actual type realizations of an agent must approach the true prior distribution as
the horizon grows. Thus, at any given history, if an agent has made type announcements
that differ too much from the true distribution, it is highly likely that there have been lies,
and it may be possible to build punishments accordingly such that the desired outcome
path is supported in equilibrium. Similar methods, based on review strategies, have been
proposed to derive a number of positive results in repeated games (see Chapter 11 of
Mailath and Samuelson [16] and the references therein). Extending these techniques to
our setup may lead to a fruitful outcome.
The budgeted mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein [12] in some sense adopts a
similar approach. However, they use budgeting to derive a characterization of equilibrium
properties that every equilibrium payoff profile must be arbitrarily close to the efficient
target profile if the discount factor is sufficiently large and the horizon long enough.18
Their existence arguments on the other hand is not based on a budgeting (review strategy)
type argument; in their setup the game played by the agents is finite and existence is
obtained by appealing to standard existence results for a mixed equilibrium in a finite
game. In our infinitely repeated setup we cannot appeal to such results because any game
induced by any non-trivial regime will have infinite number of strategies.
18Recall that our approach delivers a sharper equilibrium characterization (i.e. precise, rather than
approximate, matching between equilibrium and target payoffs obtained independently of δ) for a general
incomplete information environment.
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4.4 Ex post repeated implementation
The concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium has drawn frequent criticism because it requires
each agent to behave optimally against others for a given distribution of types and, hence,
is sensitive to the precise details of the agents’ beliefs about the others. We now show that
our main results in this section can in fact be made sharper by addressing such a concern.
To see how our Bayesian results above can be extended in this way, recall Lemmas 6 and
8 above and their proofs. These claims are established by deviation arguments that do
not actually depend on the deviator’s knowledge of the others’ private information.
One way to formalize this point is to adopt the concept of ex post equilibrium, which
requires the (private) strategy of each agent to be optimal against other agents’ strategies
for every possible realization of types. Though a weaker concept than dominant strat-
egy implementation, ex post implementation in the one-shot setup is still an excessively
demanding task (see Jehiel at al [13] and others). It turns out that, in our repeated
setup, the same regimes used to obtain Bayesian implementation of efficient SCFs can
deliver an even sharper set of positive results if the requirements of ex post equilibrium
are introduced. The results below are obtained with the same set of conditions as in the
complete information case, without the extra conditions υ and χ assumed previously in
this section for Bayesian repeated implementation.
In our repeated setup, informational asymmetry at each decision node concerns the
agents’ types in the past and present; the future is equally uncertain to all. Thus, for our
repeated setup, it is natural to require the agents’ strategies to be mutually optimal given
any information that is available to all agents at every possible decision node of a regime
(see Bergemann and Morris [4] for a definition of one-shot ex post implementation). To
this end, denote, for any regime R and any strategy profile σ, each agent i’s expected
continuation payoff of i at period τ ≥ t conditional on knowing type realizations (θ(t), θt)
as follows: for τ = t,
piti(σ,R|θ(t), θt) = (1−δ)
ui(aθ(t),θt , θt) + ∑
s≥t+1
∑
θ(s−t)
∑
θs
δs−tq (θ(s− t), θs)ui
(
aθ(t),θ
t,θ(s−t),θs , θs
) ,
and, for any τ > t,
piτi (σ,R|θ(t), θt) = (1− δ)
∑
s≥τ
∑
θ(s−t)
∑
θs
δs−τq (θ(s− t), θs)ui
(
aθ(t),θ
t,θ(s−t),θs , θs
)
.
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We shall then say that a strategy profile σ is an ex post equilibrium of R if, for any
i, t, θ(t) and θt, piti (σ,R|θ(t), θt) ≥ piti (σ′i, σ−i, R|θ(t), θt) for all σ′i ∈ Σi. Thus, at any
history along the equilibrium path, the agents’ strategies must be mutual best responses
for every possible type realizations up to, and including, the period.19
Let Q
δ
(R) denote the set of ex post equilibria of regime R with discount factor δ.
The definitions of repeated implementation with ex post equilibrium are analogous to
those with Bayesian equilibrium as in Definition 4. We obtain the following result by
considering regime B∗ defined in Section 4.2. Here, the existence of an ex post equilibrium
is ensured by ex post incentive compatibility, that is, ui (f(θ), θ) ≥ ui (f(θ′i, θ−i), θ) for all
i, θ = (θi, θ−i) and θ′i.
Theorem 6 Fix any I ≥ 2. If f is efficient (in the range), ex post incentive compati-
ble and satisfies condition ω ( ω′), f is payoff-repeated-implementable in ex post equilib-
rium from period 2. If, in addition, f is strictly efficient (in the range), f is repeated-
implementable in ex post equilibrium from period 2.
The proof proceeds in a similar way to the arguments appearing in Section 3 for the
complete information setup. It is therefore relegated to the Appendix. Note that Theorem
6 presents results that are, compared to the Bayesian results, sharper not only in terms
of payoff implementation but also in terms of outcome implementation.
Our final result demonstrates how the same regime, B˜∗, that was used to drop incentive
compatibility for Bayesian repeated implementation in the interdependent value case can
also deliver analogous results for ex post repeated implementation. If the agents are
sufficiently patient it is indeed possible to obtain the results without ex post incentive
compatibility, which has been identified as incompatible with ex post implementation in
the one-shot setup (Jehiel et al [13]).
19A stronger definition of ex post equilibrium would be to require that the strategies be mutually
optimal at every possible infinite sequence of type profiles. Such a definition, however, would not be
in the spirit of repeated settings in which decisions are made before future realizations of uncertainty.
Also, such a definition would be excessively demanding. For example, in regime B∗ ex post incentive
compatibility no longer guarantees existence: if others always tell the truth and report zero integer, for
some infinite sequence of states it may be better for a player to report a postive integer and become the
odd-one-out.
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Theorem 7 Consider the case of interdependent values. Suppose that f satisfies effi-
ciency, identifiability and condition ω′′. Then, we have the following: there exist a regime
R and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯,1), (i) Qδ(R) is non-empty; and (ii) every
σ ∈ Qδ(R) is such that Epiti(σ,R) = vi(f) for all i and t ≥ 2.
The proof appears in the Appendix. It adapts the arguments for Theorem 6 to those
for Theorem 5, and notes that the strategy profile constructed to prove Lemma 11 also
constitutes an ex post equilibrium of regime B˜∗.
5 Concluding discussion
5.1 Period 1
Our sufficiency Theorems 2-7 do not guarantee period 1 implementation of the SCF.
We offer two comments. First, period 1 can be thought of as a pre-play round that
takes place before the first state is realized. If such a round was available, one could
ask the agents simply to announce a non-negative integer with the same transitions and
continuation regimes such that each agent’s equilibrium payoff at the beginning of the
game corresponds exactly to the target level. The continuation regimes would then ensure
that the continuation payoffs remained correct at every subsquent history.
Second, period 1 implementation can also be achieved if the players have a preference
for simpler strategies at the margin, in a similar way that complexity-based equilibrium
refinements have yielded sharper predictions in various dynamic game settings (see Chat-
terjee and Sabourian [8] for a recent survey). This literature offers a number of different
definitions of complexity of a strategy and of equilibrium concepts in the presence of com-
plexity.20 To obtain our repeated implementation results from period 1, only a minimal
addition of complexity aversion is needed. We need (i) any measure of complexity of a
strategy under which a Markov strategy is simpler than a non-Markov strategy and (ii)
a refinement of (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in which each player cares for complexity of
his strategy lexicographically after payoffs, that is, each player only chooses among the
minimally complex best responses to the others’ strategies. One can then show that every
20A most well-known measure of strategic complexity is the size of minimal automaton (in terms of
number of states) that implement the strategy (e.g. Abreu and Rubinstein [1]).
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equilibrium in the canonical regimes above, with both complete and incomplete informa-
tion, must be Markov and hence the main results extend to implementation from outset.
We refer the reader to the Supplementary Material for formal statements and proofs.
5.2 Non-exclusive SCF
In our analysis thus far, repeated implementation of an efficient SCF has been obtained
with an auxiliary condition ω (or its variation ω′) which assumes that, for each agent, the
(one-period) expected utility from implementation of the SCF must be bounded below
by that of some constant SCF. The role of this condition is to construct, for each agent,
a history-independent and non-strategic continuation regime in which the agent derives a
payoff equal to the target level. We next define another condition that can fulfil the same
role: an SCF is non-exclusive if, for each i, there exists some j 6= i such that vi(f) ≥ vji .
The name of this property comes from the fact that, otherwise, there must exist some
agent i such that vi(f) < v
j
i for all j 6= i; in other words, there exists an agent who strictly
prefers a dictatorship by any other agent to the SCF itself.
Non-exclusion enables us to build for any i a history-independent regime that appro-
priately alternates dictatorial mechanisms d(i) and d(j) for some j 6= i (instead of d(i)
and some trivial mechanism φ(a)) such that agent i can guarantee payoff vi(f) exactly.
We cannot say that either condition ω (or ω′) or non-exclusion is a weaker requirement
than the other.21
5.3 Off the equilibrium
In one-shot implementation, it has been shown that one can improve the range of achiev-
able objectives by employing extensive form mechanisms together with refinements of
Nash equilibrium as solution concept (Moore and Repullo [23] and Abreu and Sen [2] with
complete information, and Bergin and Sen [6] with incomplete information, among oth-
ers). Although this paper also considers a dynamic setup, the solution concept adopted is
that of (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium and our characterization results do not rely on impos-
ing a particular assumption off-the-equilibrium behavior or beliefs to “kill off” unwanted
equilibria. At the same time, our existence results do not involve construction of Nash
equilibria based on non-credible threats and/or unreasonable beliefs off-the-equilibrium.
21See the Supplementary Material for related examples.
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Thus, we can replicate the same set of results with subgame perfect or sequential equilib-
rium as the solution concept.
A related issue is that of efficiency of off-the-equilibrium paths. In one-shot extensive
form implementation, it is often the case that off-the-equilibrium inefficiency is imposed
in order to sustain desired outcomes on-the-equilibrium. Several authors have, therefore,
investigated to what extent the possibility of renegotiation affects the scope of imple-
mentability (for example, Maskin and Moore [19]). For many of our repeated implemen-
tation results, this needs not be a cause for concern since off-the-equilibrium outcomes in
our regimes can actually be made efficient. Recall that the requirement of condition ω is
that, for each agent i, there exists some outcome a˜i which gives the agent an expected
utility less than or equal to that of the SCF. If the environment is rich enough, such an
outcome can indeed be found on the efficient frontier itself. Moreover, if the SCF is non-
exclusive, the regimes can be constructed so that off-the-equilibrium is entirely associated
with dictatorial outcomes, which are efficient.
5.4 Other assumptions
In this paper, we have restricted our attention to implementation in pure strategies only.
Mixed/behavior strategies can be incorporated into our setup. To see this, notice that
the additional uncertainty arising from randomization does not alter the substance of
deviation argument that ensures each agent’s continuation payoffs in the canonical regimes
to be bounded below exactly by the target payoff (see the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 6).
Even if other agents randomize over an infinite support, an agent can guarantee that he
will have the highest integer with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Finally, this paper considers the case in which preferences follow an i.i.d. process. A
potentially important extension is to generalize the process with which individual prefer-
ences evolve. However, since our definition of efficiency depends on the prior (ex ante)
distribution, allowing for history-dependent distribution makes such efficiency a less nat-
ural social objective than in the present i.i.d. setup. Also, this extension will introduce
the additional issue of learning. We shall leave these questions for future research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3 Consider any SCF f that satisfies ω. Define mechanism gˆ =
(M,ψ) as follows: Mi = Θ× Z+ for all i and ψ is such that
1. if m1 = (θ, ·) and m2 = (θ, ·), then ψ(m) = f(θ);
2. if m1 = (θ
1, ·) and m2 = (θ2, ·), and θ1 6= θ2, then ψ(m) ∈ L1(θ2) ∩ L2(θ1) (by
self-selection, this is well defined).
Regime R̂ is defined to be such that R̂(∅) = gˆ and, for any h = ((g1,m1), . . . , (gt−1,mt−1)) ∈
H t such that t > 1 and gt−1 = gˆ:
1. if mt−11 = (·, 0) and mt−1j = (·, 0), then R̂(h) = gˆ;
2. if mt−1i = (·, zi), mt−1j = (·, 0) and zi 6= 0, then R̂|h = Si, where Si ∈ S(i, a˜i) such
that vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i) and pii(Si) = vi(f);
3. if mt−1 is of any other type and i is lowest-indexed agent among those who announce
the highest integer, then R̂|h = Di.
We prove the claim via the following claims.
Claim 1: Fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R̂). For any t > 1 and θ(t), if gθ(t) = gˆ, piθ(t)i ≥ vi(f).
This can be established by analogous reasoning to that behind Lemma 2.
Claim 2: Fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R̂). Also, assume that, for each i, outcome a˜i ∈ A used in
the construction of Si above satisfies (4) in the main text. Then, for any t and θ(t), if
gθ(t) = gˆ then m
θ(t),θt
i = (·, 0) and mθ(t),θ
t
j = (·, 0) for any θt.
Suppose not; then, for some t, θ(t) and θt, gθ(t) = gˆ and the continuation regime next
period at h(θ(t), θt) is either Di or Si for some i. By a similar reasoning as with the
three-or-more-player case, it then follows that, for j 6= i,
pi
θ(t),θt
j < v
j
j (8)
Consider two possibilities. If the continuation regime is Si = Φ(a˜i) then pi
θ(t),θt
i =
vi(f) = vi(a˜
i) and hence (8) follows from (4) in the main text. If the continuation regime
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is Di or Si 6= Φ(a˜i), d(i) occurs in some period. But then (8) follows from vj(a˜i) ≤ vjj
and vij < v
j
j (where the latter inequality follows from Assumption (A)).
Then, given (8), agent j can profitably deviate at (h(θ(t)), θt) by announcing the same
state as σj and an integer higher than i’s integer choice at such a history. This is because
the deviation does not alter the current outcome (given the definition of ψ of gˆ) but
induces regime Dj in which, by (8), j obtains vjj > pi
θ(t),θt
j . But this is a contradiction.
Claim 3: Assume that f is efficient in the range and, for each i, outcome a˜i ∈ A used
in the construction of Si above satisfies (4) in the main text. Then, for any σ ∈ Ωδ(R̂),
pi
θ(t)
i = vi(f) for any i, t > 1 and θ(t).
Given Claims 1-2, and since f is efficient in the range, we can directly apply the proof
of Lemma 4 in the main text.
Claim 4: Ωδ(R̂) is non-empty if self-selction holds.
Consider a symmetric Markov strategy profile in which, for any θ, each agent reports
(θ, 0). Given ψ and self-selection, any unilateral deviation by i at any θ results either in
no change in the current period outcome (if he does not change his announced state) or
it results in current period outcome belonging to Li(θ). Also, given the transition rules,
a deviation does not improve continuation payoff at the next period either. Therefore,
given self-selection, it does not pay i to deviate from his strategy.
Finally, given Claims 3-4, the proof of Theorem 3 follows by exactly the same reasoning
as those of Theorem 2 and its Corollary.
Proof of Lemma 10 Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗). We proceed with the following claims.
Claim 1: Suppose that f is efficient and satisfies condition ω′′. Fix any t > 1. Assume
that, for any θ(t), gθ(t) = b˜∗ and also that, at any θt, every agent reports “no flag” in
Stage 2. Then, for any i, Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i = vi(f) for all θ(t) and hence Epi
t+1
i = vi(f).
Since, in the above claim, it is assumed that every agent reports “no flag” in Stage 2
at any θt, the claim can be proved analogously to Lemmas 6 and 7 above.
Claim 2: Suppose that f is efficient and satisfies conditions ω′′ and υ. Fix any t > 1.
Assume that, for any θ(t), gθ(t) = b˜∗ and also that, at any θt, every agent reports “no
flag” in Stage 2. Then, for any θ(t+ 1), the following two properties hold: (i) gθ(t+1) = b˜∗
and (ii) every agent will report “no flag” at period t+ 1 for any θt+1.
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Again, since in the above claim it is assumed that every agent reports “no flag” in
Stage 2 at any θt, part (i) of the claim can be established analogously to Lemma 8 above.
To prove part (ii), suppose otherwise; then some agent reports “flag” in Stage 2 of
period t+ 1 at some sequence of states θˆ1, .., θˆt+1.
For any s and θ(s) ∈ Θs−1 define SCF f θ(s) by f θ(s)(θ) = aθ(s),θ(σ, B˜∗) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Then Epit+1i can be written as
Epit+1i = (1− δ)
∑
θ(t+1)
q(θ(t+ 1))vi(f
θ(t+1)) + δ
∑
s≥t+2
∑
θ(s)
δs−t−2q(θ(s))vi(f θ(s))
 . (9)
Next, for any s > t + 1, let Θ̂s−1 =
{
θ(s) = (θ1, .., θs−1) : θτ = θˆτ ∀τ ≤ t+ 1
}
be the
set of (s− 1) states that are consistent with θˆ1, . . . , θˆt+1. Since there is flaging in period
t+ 1 after the sequence of states θˆ1, . . . , θˆt+1 it follows that, for all i,
(1− δ)
∑
s≥t+2
∑
θ(s)∈bΘs−1
δs−t−2q(θ(s))vi(f θ(s)) = αvi(a˜), (10)
where α = (1− δ)∑s≥t+2∑θ(s)∈bΘs−1 δs−t−2q(θ(s)). Also, by the previous claim, Epit+1i =
vi(f) for all i. Therefore, it follows from (9), (10), and v(a˜) v(f) that, for all i,
vi(f) <
(1− δ)
(1− δα)
 ∑
θ(t+1)∈Θt
q(θ(t+ 1))vi
(
f θ(t+1)
)
+ δ
∑
s≥t+2
∑
θ(s)/∈bΘs−1
δs−t−2q(θ(s))vi
(
f θ(s)
) .
(11)
Since
∑
θ(t+1) q(θ(t + 1)) = 1 and α + (1 − δ)
∑
s≥t+2
∑
θ(s)/∈bΘs−1 δs−t−2q(θ(s)) = 1 by
definition, it follows that∑
θ(t+1)
q(θ(t+ 1)) + δ
∑
s≥t+2
∑
θ(s)/∈bΘs
δs−t−2q(θ(s)) =
(1− δα)
(1− δ) .
Therefore, by (11), f is not efficient; but this is a contradiction.
Claim 3: (i) Epi2i = vi(f) for all i; (ii) g
θ(2) = b˜∗ for any θ(2) ∈ Θ; and (iii) every
agent will report “no flag” in Stage 2 of period 2 for any θ(2) and θ2.
Since B˜∗(∅) = Z, we can establish (i) and (ii) by applying similar arguments as those
in Lemmas 6-8 to period 1. Also, by similar reasoning for Claim 2 just above, it must be
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that no player flags in period 2 at any (θ(2), θ2); otherwise the continuation payoff profile
will be v(a˜) from period 3 and this is inconcistent with Epi2i = vi(f) > vi(a˜) for all i.
Finally, to complete the proof of Lemma 10, note that, by induction, it follows from
Claims 1-3 that, for any t, θ(t) and θt, gθ(t) = b˜∗ and, moreover, every agent will report
“no flag”in Stage 2 of period t. But then, Claims 1 and 3 imply that Eθ(t)pi
t+1
i = vi(f)
for all i, t and θ(t).
Proof of Theorem 6 We shall first characterize the set of ex post equilibria of regime
B∗ constructed in Section 4.2. We proceed with the following claims. It is assumed
throughout this proof that f satisfies condition ω and, for each i, outcome a˜i ∈ A used in
the construction of Si in regime B∗ satisfies condition (4) in the main text.
Claim 1: Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), t and θ(t), and suppose that gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗. Then,
m
θ(t),θt
i (σ,B
∗) = (·, 0) for all i and θt.
To show this, suppose otherwise; so, at some t and θ(t), gθ(t) = b∗ but mθ(t),θ
t
i = (·, zi)
with zi > 0 for some i and θt. Then there must exist some j 6= i such that
pit+1j (σ,B
∗|θ(t), θt) < vjj . (12)
The reasoning for this is identical to that for Claim 2 in the proof of Lemma 3, except
that pi
θ(t),θt
j there is replaced by pi
t+1
j (σ,B
∗|θ(t), θt).
Next, consider j deviating to another strategy σ′j which yields the same outcome path
as the equilibrium strategy, σj, at every history, except at (hj(θ(t)), θ
t
j), θ
t = (θtj, θ
t
−j),
where it announces the type announced by σj and an integer higher than any integer that
can be reported by σ at this history.
Given ψ of mechanism b∗, such a deviation does not change the utility that j receives
in period t under type profile θt; furthermore, by the definition of B∗, the continuation
regime is Dj and, hence, pit+1j (σ
′
i, σ−i, B
∗|θ(t), θt) = vjj . But, given (12), this means
that pitj(σ
′
i, σ−i, B
∗|θ(t), θt) > pitj(σ,B∗|θ(t), θt), which contradicts that σ is an ex post
equilibrium of B∗.
Claim 2: Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), t and θ(t). Then, (i) gθ(t)(σ,B∗) = b∗; and (ii)
aθ(t),θ
t
(σ,B∗) ∈ f(Θ) for all θt.
This follows immediately from Claim 1 above and the fact that B∗(∅) = b∗.
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Claim 3: Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), t, θ(t) and θt. Then pit+1i (σ,B∗ | θ(t), θt) ≥ vi(f) for
all i.
Suppose not; so, for some σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), t, θ(t) and θt = (θti , θt−i), pit+1i (σ,B∗|θ(t), θt) <
vi(f) for some i. Then, consider i deviating to σ
′
i identical to σi except at (hi(θ(t)), θ
t
i) it
announces the same type as σi but a positive integer. (By previous Claim, b
∗ is played
and every agent announces zero at this history.)
By the definition of B∗ and previous Claim, this deviation only changes the continua-
tion regime to Si from which on average vi(f) can be obtained. Thus, pi
t
i(σ
′
i, σ−i, B
∗|θ(t), θt) >
piti(σ,B
∗|θ(t), θt). This contradicts that σ is an ex post equilibrium of B∗.
Claim 4: Suppose that f is efficient in the range. Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B∗), t, θ(t) and θt.
Then, for all i, pit+1i (σ,B
∗ | θ(t), θt) = vi(f).
This follows from Claim 2-3 and efficiency in the range of f .
To complete the proof of the theorem, note first that the existence of an ex post
equilibrium follows immediately from the equilibrium definition and ex post incentive
compatibility of f . Next, note that payoff implementability then follows from the previous
claim and noting that Epit+1i (σ,B
∗) =
∑
θ(t),θt q(θ(t), θ
t)pit+1i (σ,B
∗ | θ(t), θt) via analogous
reasoning to that behind Theorem 2 and its Corollary. This reasoning also delivers the
last part of the theorem on strict efficiency and outcome implementability.
Proof of Theorem 7 Consider regime B˜∗ in Section 4.3. It is straightforward to show
that, given identifiability and condition ω′′, the same strategy profile appearing in the
proof of Lemma 11 is also a ex post equilibrium of regime B˜∗ with sufficiently patient
agents; this establishes part (i) of the theorem. To prove part (ii), it suffices to prove
the following characterization of the ex post equilibria of regime B˜∗ (this result is the
analogue to Lemma 10 that was used above to prove Bayesian implementation via B˜∗).
Claim: If f is efficient and satisfies condition ω′′, every σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗) is such that
pit+1i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt) = vi(f) for any i, t, θ(t) and θt.
To prove this we proceed with the following steps that will lead to induction arguments.
Step 1: Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗), t, θ(t) and θt, and suppose that gθ(t)(σ, B˜∗) = b˜∗. In
addition, suppose that, in period t, every agent plays “no flag” in stage 2. Then, we have:
(i) Every agent also reports zero integer and, hence, gθ(t),θ
t
= b˜∗.
(ii) pit+1i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt) = vi(f) for all i.
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(iii) In period t+ 1, every agent will play “no flag” at any θt+1.
Since condition ω′′ subsumes both conditions ω and (4) in the main text, and since we
assume that every agent plays “no flag” in period t, part (i) can be established analogously
to Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 6 above. Given efficiency of f , part (ii) can be proved
using similar arguments to those behind Claims 3-4 in the same proof. (Here, note that
we need efficiency over the entire set of SCFs, not just in the range. This is because we
have had to make the additional assumption of “no flag”.)
To prove part (iii), suppose otherwise; so, at some θt+1, some agent plays “flag”.
Given the transition rules, the continuation regime starting in t+ 2 implements a˜ forever.
Therefore, for all i, we have
pit+1i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt) = (1− δ)
∑
θ
p(θ)ui(a
θ(t),θt,θ, θ)
+δ
∑
θ∈Θ\θt+1
p(θ)pit+2i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt, θ) + δp(θt+1)vi(a˜). (13)
But, for all i, pit+1i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt) = vi(f) and vi(a˜) < vi(f). Thus, by (13), we have
(1− δ)
∑
θ
p(θ)ui(a
θ(t),θt,θ, θ) + δ
∑
θ∈Θ\θt+1
p(θ)pit+2i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt, θ) > vi(f)
1− δp(θt+1) , (14)
for all i. Since
[∑
θ p(θ)ui(a
θ(t),θt,θ, θ)
]
i∈I ∈ V ,
[
pit+2i (σ, B˜
∗|θ(t), θt, θ)
]
i∈I
∈ co(V ) for all
θ and (1− δ) + δ∑θ∈Θ\θt+1 p(θ) = 1− p(θt+1), it follows from (14) that f is not efficient.
But this is a contradiction.
Step 2: Fix any σ ∈ Qδ(B˜∗) and θ1. Then, we have: (i) gθ1 = b˜∗, (ii) pi2i (σ, B˜∗|θ1) =
vi(f) for all i, and (iii) in period 2, every agent plays “no flag” at any θ
2.
We can apply the arguments for Step 1 above to period 1 and derive Step 2. The
claim then follows from applying Steps 1-2 inductively.
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1 Complete information: the two agent case
Theorem 1. Suppose that I = 2, and consider an SCF f satisfying condition ω′′. If f
is efficient in the range, there exist a regime R and δ¯ such that, for any δ > δ¯,(i) Ωδ(R)
is non-empty; and (ii) for any σ ∈ Ωδ(R), piθ(t)i (σ,R) = vi(f) for any i, t ≥ 2 and θ(t).
If, in addition, f is strictly efficient in the range then aθ(t),θ
t
(σ,R) = f(θt) for any t ≥ 2,
θ(t) and θt.
Proof. By condition ω′′ there exists some a˜ ∈ A be such that v(a˜) v(f). Following
Lemma 1 in the main text, let Si be the regime alternating d(i) and φ(a˜) from which i
can obtain payoff exactly equal to vi(f). For any j, let pij(S
i) be the maximum payoff
that j can obtain from regime Si when i behaves rationally in d(i). Since Si involves d(i),
Assumption (A) in the main text implies that vjj > pij(S
i) for j 6= i. Then there must
also exist  > 0 such that vj(a˜) < vi(f)−  and pij(Si) < vii−  for any i, j such that i 6= j.
Next, define ρ ≡ maxi,θ,a,a′ [ui(a, θ)− ui(a′, θ)] and δ¯ ≡ ρρ+ .
Mechanism g˜ = (M,ψ) is defined such that, for all i, Mi = Θ×Z+ and ψ is such that
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1
1. if mi = (θ, ·) and mj = (θ, ·), ψ(m) = f(θ);
2. if mi = (θ
i, zi), mj = (θ
j, 0) and zi 6= 0, ψ(m) = f(θj);
3. for any other m, ψ(m) = a˜.
Regime R˜ represents any regime satisfying the following transition rules: R˜(∅) = g˜
and, for any h = ((g1,m1), . . . , (gt−1,mt−1)) ∈ H t such that t > 1 and gt−1 = g˜:
1. if mt−1i = (θ, 0) and m
t−1
j = (θ, 0), R˜(h) = g˜;
2. if mt−1i = (θ
i, 0), mt−1j = (θ
j, 0) and θi 6= θj, R˜(h) = Φa˜;
3. if mt−1i = (θ
i, zi), mt−1j = (θ
j, 0) and zi 6= 0, R˜|h = Si;
4. if mt−1 is of any other type and i is lowest-indexed agent among those who announce
the highest integer, R˜|h = Di.
We next prove the theorem via the following lemmas below, which characterize the
equilibrium set of R˜.
Lemma 1. Fix any σ ∈ Ωδ(R˜). For any t > 1 and θ(t), if gθ(t) = g˜, piθ(t)i ≥ vi(f).
Proof. Suppose not; then at some t > 1 and θ(t), gθ(t) = g˜ but pi
θ(t)
i < vi(f) for some i.
Let θ(t) = (θ(t − 1), θt−1). Given the transition rules, it must be that gθ(t−1) = g˜ and
m
θ(t−1),θt−1
i = m
θ(t−1),θt−1
j = (θ˜, 0) for some θ˜. Consider i deviating at (h(θ(t− 1)), θt−1)
such that he reports θ˜ and a positive integer. Given ψ, the deviation does not alter the
current outcome but, by transition rule 3, can yield continuation payoff vi(f). Hence, the
deviation is profitable, implying a contradiction.
Lemma 2. Fix any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and σ ∈ Ωδ(R˜). For any t and θ(t), if gθ(t) = g˜, mθ(t),θti =
m
θ(t),θt
j = (θ, 0) for any θ
t.
Proof. Suppose not; then for some t, θ(t) and θt, gθ(t) = g˜ but mθ(t),θ
t
is not as in the
claim. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: m
θ(t),θt
i = (·, zi) and mθ(t),θ
t
j = (·, zj) with zi, zj > 0.
In this case, by rule 3 of ψ, a˜ is implemented in the current period and, by transition
rule 4, a dictatorship by, say, i follows forever thereafter. But then, by assumption (A)
2
above, j can profitably deviate by announcing an integer higher than zi at such a history;
the deviation does not alter the current outcome from a˜ but switches dictatorship to
himself as of the next period.
Case 2: m
θ(t),θt
i = (·, zi) and mθ(t),θ
t
j = (θ
j, 0) with zi > 0.
In this case, by rule 2 of ψ, f(θj) is implemented in the current period and, by transition
rule 3, continuation regime Si follows thereafter. Consider j deviating to another strategy
identical to σj everywhere except at (h(θ(t)), θ
t) it announces an integer higher than
zi. Given rule 3 of ψ and transition rule 4, this deviation yields a continuation payoff
(1 − δ)uj(a˜, θt) + δvjj , while the corresponding equilibrium payoff does not exceed (1 −
δ)uj(f(θ
j), θt) + δpij(S
i). But, since vjj > pij(S
i) +  and δ > δ¯, the former exceeds the
latter, and the deviation is profitable.
Case 3: m
θ(t),θt
i = (θ
i, 0) and m
θ(t),θt
j = (θ
j, 0) with θi 6= θj.
In this case, by rule 3 of ψ, a˜ is implemented in the current period and, by transition
rule 2, in every period thereafter. Consider any agent i deviating by announcing a positive
integer at (h(θ(t)), θt). Given rule 2 of ψ and transition rule 3, such a deviation yields
continuation payoff (1−δ)ui(f(θj), θt)+δvi(f), while the corresponding equilibrium payoff
is (1− δ)ui(a˜, θt) + δvi(a˜). But, since vi(f) > vi(a˜) +  and δ > δ¯, the former exceeds the
latter, and the deviation is profitable.
Lemma 3. For any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and σ ∈ Ωδ(R˜), piθ(t)i = vi(f) for any i, t > 1 and θ(t).
Proof. Given Lemmas 1-2, and since f is efficient in the range, we can directly apply the
proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 in the main text.
Lemma 4. For any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), Ωδ(R˜) is non-empty.
Proof. Consider a symmetric Markov strategy profile in which the true state and zero
integer are always reported. At any history, each agent i can deviate in one of the
following three ways:
(i) Announce the true state but a positive integer. Given rule 1 of ψ and transition
rule 3, such a deviation is not profitable.
(ii) Announce a false state and a positive integer. Given rule 2 of ψ and transition
rule 3, such a deviation is not profitable.
(iii) Announce zero integer but a false state. In this case, by rule 3 of ψ, a˜ is imple-
mented in the current period and, by transition rule 2, in every period thereafter. The
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gain from such a deviation cannot exceed (1−δ) maxa,θ [ui(a˜, θ)− ui(a, θ)]−δ < 0, where
the inequality holds since δ > δ¯. Thus, the deviation is not profitable.
2 Complexity-averse agents
One approach to sharpen predictions in dynamic games has been to introduce refinements
of the standard equilibrium concepts with players who have preferences for less complex
strategies (Abreu and Rubinstein [1], Kalai and Stanford [5], Chatterjee and Sabourian
[2], Sabourian [7], Gale and Sabourian [3] and Lee and Sabourian [6], among others). We
now introduce complexity considerations to our repeated implementation setup. It turns
out that only a minimal refinement is needed to obtain repeated implementation results
from period 1.
Consider any measure of complexity of a strategy under which a Markov strategy is
simpler than a non-Markov strategy.1 Then, refine Nash equilibrium lexicographically as
follows: a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) constitutes a Nash equilibrium with complexity
cost, NEC, of regime R if, for all i, (i) σi is a best response to σ−i; and (ii) there exists no
σ′i such that σ
′
i is a best response to σ−i at every history and σ
′
i is simpler than σi.
2 Let
Ωδ,c(R) denote the set of NECs of regime R with discount factor δ. The following extends
the notions of Nash repeated implementation to the case with complexity-averse agents.
Definition 1. An SCF f is payoff-repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium with com-
plexity cost if there exists a regime R such that (i) Ωδ,c(R) is non-empty; and (ii) every
σ ∈ Ωδ,c(R) is such that piθ(t)i (σ,R) = vi(f) for all i, t and θ(t); f is repeated-implementable
in Nash equilibrium with complexity cost if, in addition, aθ(t),θ
t
(σ,R) = f(θ) for any t,
θ(t) and θt.
Let us now consider the canonical regime in the complete information setup with
I ≥ 3, R∗.3 Since, by definition, a NEC is also a Nash equilibrium, Lemmas 2-4 in the
1There are many complexity notions that possess this property. One example is provided by Kalai
and Stanford [5] who measure the number of continuation strategies that a strategy induces at different
periods/histories of the game.
2Note that the complexity cost here concerns the cost associated with implementation, rather than
computation, of a strategy.
3Corresponding results for the two-agent complete information as well as incomplete information cases
can be similarly derived and, hence, omitted for expositional flow.
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main text remain true for NEC. Moreover, since a Markov Nash equilibrium is itself a
NEC, Ωδ,c(R∗) is non-empty. In addition, we obtain the following.
Lemma 5. Every σ ∈ Ωδ,c(R∗) is Markov.
Proof. Suppose that there exists some σ ∈ Ωδ,c(R∗) such that σi is non-Markov for some
i. Then, consider i deviating to a Markov strategy, σ′i 6= σi, such that when playing g∗
it always announces (i) the same positive integer and (ii) the state announced by σi in
period 1, and when playing d(i), it acts rationally. Fix any θ1 ∈ Θ. By part (ii) of Lemma
3 in the main text and the definitions of g∗ and R∗, we have aθ
1
(σ′i, σ−i, R
∗) = aθ
1
(σ,R∗)
and piθ
1
i (σ
′
i, σ−i, R
∗) = vi(f). Moreover, we know from Lemma 4 in the main text that
piθ
1
i (σ,R
∗) = vi(f). Thus, the deviation does not alter i’s payoff. But, since σ′i is less
complex than σi, such a deviation is worthwhile for i. This contradicts the assumption
that σ is a NEC.
This immediately leads to the following result.
Theorem 2. If f is efficient (in the range) and satisfies conditions ω (ω′), f is payoff-
repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium with complexity cost; if, in addition, f is
strictly efficient (in the range), it is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium with
complexity cost.
Note that the notion of NEC does not impose any payoff considerations off the equi-
librium path; although complexity enters players’ preferences only at the margin it takes
priority over optimal responses to deviations. A weaker equilibrium refinement than NEC
is therefore to require players to adopt minimally complex strategies among the set of
strategies that are best responses at every history, and not merely at the beginning of the
game (see Kalai and Neme [4]).
In fact, the complexity results in our repeated implementation setup can also be ob-
tained using this weaker notion if we limit the strategies to those that are finite (i.e. can
be implemented by a machine with a finite number of states). To see this, consider again
the three-or-more-agent case with complete information, and modify the mechanism g∗ in
regime R∗ such that if two or more agents play distinct messages then one who announces
the highest integer becomes a dictator for the period. Fix any equilibrium (under this
weaker refinement) in this new regime. By the finiteness of strategies there is a maximum
bound z on the integers reported by the players at each date. Now, for any player i and
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any history (on- or off-the-equilibrium) starting with the modified mechanism g∗, compare
the equilibrium strategy with any Markov strategy for i that always announces a number
exceeding z and acts rationally in mechanism d(i). By a similar argument as in the proof
of Lemmas 2-4 in the main text, it can be shown that i’s equilibrium continuation payoff
beyond period 1 is exactly the target payoff. Also, since the Markov strategy makes i the
dictator at that date and induces Si or Di in the continuation game, the Markov strategy
induces a continuation payoff at least equal to the target utility. Therefore, by complexity
considerations the equilibrium strategy must be Markov.
3 Non-exclusion vs. condition ω
Consider the following two examples. First, consider P where I = {1, 2}, A = {a, b},
Θ = {θ′, θ′′}, p(θ′) = p(θ′′) = 1/2 and the agents’ state-contingent utilities are given
below:
θ′ θ′′
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
a 1 3 2 3 2 1
b 3 2 1 1 3 2
c 2 1 3 2 1 3
Here, the SCF f such that f(θ′) = a and f(θ′′) = b is efficient but fails to satisfy
condition ω because of agent 1. But, notice that f is non-exclusive.
Second, consider P where I = {1, 2, 3}, A = {a, b, c, d}, Θ = {θ′, θ′′} and the agents’
state-contingent utilities are given below:
θ′ θ′′
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
a 3 2 0 1 2 1
b 2 1 1 2 3 0
c 1 3 1 3 1 1
d 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Here, the SCF such that f(θ′) = a and f(θ′′) = b is efficient and also satisfies condition
ω, but it fails to satisfy non-exclusion because of agent 3.
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